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THE SETTLEMENT REQUIREMENT IN GENERAL
ASSISTANCE*
DANIEL R. MANDELKERt
Settlement, a statutory residence period which usually must be
coupled with an intent to make the locality in question a home, is ordi-
narily a prerequisite to the receipt of general assistance. The first part
of this article traced the history and development of this requirement
and outlined the law applicable to the acquisition of a settlement. In
the remaining portion attention will be directed to the limitations on
the acquisition of a settlement and to the application of settlement
rules in the family situation.
CONDITIONS LIMITING THE ACQUISITION OF SETTLEMENT
Warning Ozit
I n addition to those judicially-imposed requirements which, in effect,
place qualitative limits on the acquisition of a settlement, the general
assistance statutes contain many other provisions which have the
effect of reducing the number of persons able to acquire a settlement
by residence. The first to be discussed, though now practically a
matter for history, is the colonial practice of "warning out."
Warning out provisions are still contained only in the general as-
sistance laws of Iowa and South Dakota.' Both statutes provide that
persons coming into the state or going from one county to another
within the state, who are "likely to become" public charges, may be
prevented from gaining a settlement through the serving of a warning
out notice. Once having been served with such a notice, an individual
cannot acquire a settlement unless he fulfills the statutory residence
period without receiving another notice.2
The persistence of warning out provisions in only two jurisdictions
would not deserve more than passing mention were it not for the fact
that they represent the contemporary survival of an ethnocentric
exclusionary practice which was common to early Teutonic tribes
* The first part of this article appeared in the December 1955 issue of the
WASHINGTON UNIrERSITY LAW QUARTERLY and discussed the historical background
of settlement law, contemporary migration patterns, discriminatory practices to-
ward nonresidents, evaluation of the settlement requirement, and the factors of
residence and domicile in the acquisition of an original settlement. Mandelker,
The Settlement Requirement in General Assistance, 1955 WAsE. U.L.Q. 355.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University, Indianapolis Division.
1. IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.20 (1949) ; S.D. CODE § 50.0102(6) (Supp. 1952).
2. The Iowa statute also authorizes the warning out of persons who are "county
charges." Furthermore, before settlement may be acquired the individual who has
been warned must file with the county board of supervisors "an affidavit stating
that such person is no longer a pauper and intends to acquire a settlement" in the
county. IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.16(1) (1949).
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antedating truly civilized history.3 For this reason these statutes are
symbolic of the true motivation behind settlement laws. Besides, the
practice of giving warning out notices, at least in Iowa, has hardly
subsided. In a representative six-month period in 1946 it was found
that a total of 1,240 warning out notices had been served by Iowa
counties.4
Interestingly enough, the judicial treatment of warning out notices
has been far from sympathetic to the enforcement of these statutes.,
This seems to have resulted in a tendency to find noncompliance with
the terms of the statute6 and to resolve problems of statutory con-
struction in favor of the individual seeking settlement.7 Judicial hos-
tility to these statutes simply emphasizes the inconsistency between a
national policy favoring freedom of movement and a statutory require-
ment with a decidedly local bias. Repeal of the last remaining warning
out statutes seems long overdue.
Personal Incapacity
The chances of securing general assistance are further lessened by
rules which prevent some individuals from acquiring a settlement
because of their status or from counting the period during which
they occupy that particular status toward the statutory period of
residence.8 Wives and unemancipated minor children fall into this
3. 1 PALGRAvE, RIsE AND PRoGREss OF THE ENGLISH COMMONWEALTH 83 (1832).Vermont, in 1817, was the last New England state to abandon warning out.
BENTON, WARNING OUT IN NEw ENGLAND 114 (1911). The practice of warning
out by the early colonies has been defended as an essential barrier against the in-
vasion of persons who would contribute little to community life, yet would draw
on the community's slim provisions against hard times. Id. at 118.
4. Ross, LEGAL SETTLEMENT AND WARNING OUT IN IoWA 97 (unpublished thesis
in University of Nebraska Library 1951). The effect of the service of such a notice
on the unsuspecting newcomer cannot be underestimated. The Pottawattamie
County form of warning out notice states that "it is presumed that you are a
county charge or are likely to become such." Id. at 102.
5. The following statement seems typical:This is a free country. People generally have the right to settle where
they please .... [This statute] is the placing of an unusual power, the
exercise of which might cause serious hardship, and it is because of this un-
usual power that the courts universally have held that the power, in order
to be effective, must be exercised strictly according to statute.
Emmet County ex rel. Johnston v. Dally, 216 Iowa 166, 169-70, 248 N.W. 366, 367(1933). See also Inhabitants of Franklin v. Inhabitants of Dedham, 35 Mass. (18
Pick.) 544 (1836) (under prior law).
6. See the cases cited in note 5 supra.
7. See, e.g., Jaffrey v. Mont Vernon, 8 N.H. 436 (1827) (under prior law,
warning out notice must name the person to be warned; general authority not
sufficient); Wayne Township v. Stock Township, 3 Ohio *171 (1827) (under priorlaw, statute not explicit on the point construed to require new notice every year
to prevent acquisition of settlement).
8. Fortunately, aliens residing in the United States have been held to have the
same rights as American citizens to acquire a settlement for general assistance.
Inhabitants of Knox v. Inhabitants of Waldoborough, 3 Me. *455 (1825); Litch-
field v. County of Meeker, 182 Minn. 150, 233 N.W. 804 (1930); Town of Barton
v. Albany, 108 Vt. 531 189 Atl. 853 (1937); Town of Derby v. Town of Salem, 30
Vt. *722 (1858). See Augusta v. Waterville, 106 Me. 394, 76 Atl. 707 (1910).
Connecticut still retains a provision that a person first coming to reside in any
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group. Because they are not considered sui juris under the law of
domestic relations, they are denied the opportunity to acquire a settle-
ment in their own right. Wives and children, however, receive protec-
tion from the law of derivative settlement, which will be discussed in
the next section.
At this point, however, it would seem appropriate to discuss other
groups of individuals who are equated with persons not sui juris and
who may not be protected by derivative settlement principles. To
begin with, most courts which have passed on the question have held
that mentally incapacitated persons may not acquire a settlement in
their own right," though some courts have held to the contrary-" Why
mentally incapacitated persons cannot acquire a settlement is not clear
except for what appears to be the influence of free will theories on the
law of settlement. This seems implied in the intent requirement it-
self," but it is explicitly advanced as a reason for disqualifying per-
sons not of sufficient mental capacity. M
Vhy should the concept of free will be linked with the acquisition of
town ft om outside the United States can gain a settlement in that town only upon
a vote of the inhabitants or of the overseers of the poor and the justices of the
peace acting together. Presumably, when the individual changes his residence to
another town, that section of the statute will apply which allows him to gain a
settlement by residence even though he is still an alien. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§
2574-75 (1949). Similar provisions were applied in New Hartford V. Canaan, 52
Conn. 158 (1884); Bridgeport v. Town of Trumbull, 37 Conn. 484 (1871); see
Somers v. Barkhamstead, 1 Root 398 (Conn. 1792). Montana has a statute pro-
hibiting aliens illegally in the United States from acquiring a settlement. It is
apparently aimed at Mexican "wetbacks." MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 71-304(1953~). Newx Jersey has an identical provision. N.J. REV. STAT. § 44:8A-5(g)(Supp. 1954).
9. Payne v. Town of Dunham, 29 II. 125 (1862); Fayette County v. Bremer
County, 56 Iowa 516, 9 N.W. 372 (1881); Phillips v. Boston, 183 Mass. 314, 67
N.E. 250 (1903); County of Burke v. County of Buncombe, 101 N.C. 520, 8 S.E.
176 (1888); Valley Township v. Northumberland Borough, 24 Pa. Dist. 692 (Q.S.
1914); Town of Brownington v. Town of Charleston, 32 Vt. *411 (1859). The
cases may involve applications for poor relief or attempts to fix the county of
settlement re.sponsible for the support of an institutionalized individual.
10. Town of Madison v. Town of Guilford, 85 Conn. 55, 81 At. 1046 (1911);
Town ,,f Ridgefield v. Town of Fairfield, 73 Conn. 47, 46 Atl. 245 (1900); Plym-
outh v. Waterbury, 31 Conn. 515 (1863); Inhabitants of Friendship v. Inhabitants
of Bristol, 1*32 Me. 28;, 170 AtL. 496 (1934); In re Settlement of Peniondtz, 218
Minn. 525, 16 N.W.2d 902 (1944). However, a mentally incapacitated individual
who continues to reside with his family after reaching his majority is accorded
the status of a minor and awarded the settlement of his parents.
11. Those courts which disqualify mentally incapacitated persons tend to be
those which have adopted the rule that settlement requires an intent to make the
locality a home. However, in Connecticut and Maine, where a mentally incapaci-
tated individual may acquire a settlement, the courts also adhere to the intent
rule. See Mfandelker, The Settlement Requirement in General Assistance, 1955
WASH. U.L.Q. 355, 369 n.54.
12, Thus, an individual who becomes mentally incapacitated after arriving in a
locality is not barred from acquiring a settlement, since he had the requisite voli-
tion upon his arrival and this satisfies the requirement of the statute. See Wash-
ington County v. Mahaska County, 47 Iowa 57 (1877); Inhabitants of Chicopee v.
Inhabitants of Whately, 88 Mass. (6 Alien) 508 (1863); Town of Topsham v.
Town of Williamstown, 60 Vt. 467, 12 AtI. 112 (1887). In these states a person
mentally incapacitated upon his arrival in a community may not gain a settlement.
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a settlement? It would seem that the purpose of settlement laws is
to place financial responsibility on the localities where people in fact
live, regardless of their will in that regard. Besides, the application
of this disqualification would appear somewhat difficult. Contem-
porary psychiatry recognizes many forms of psychoses, neuroses, and
psychopathic maladjustments, any of which could be said to disable
the individual from making a "free" choice regarding his place of
residence.13 Indeed, psychiatry may be said to have abandoned the
concept of a free will altogether.
The free will influence, however, has created other situations in
which the individual is deprived of a settlement because of his de-
pendent or subordinate status. One of these situations involves the in-
dividual who is institutionalized for mental or physical incapacity, or
imprisoned for the commission of a crime. It seems clear that time
spent in an institution cannot be counted toward a residence in the lo-
cality in which the institution is located.14 Several statutes, of varying
scope, also provide that time spent in an institution may not be counted
toward the residence required for settlement anywhere, including the
place the individual has just left.15 In the absence of statute the de-
cisions of the courts on the problem have been divided.10 Those courts
13. See Katz, Law, Psychiatry, and Free Will, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 397 (1955);
-f. In re Settlement of Underwood, 231 Minn. 144, 42 N.W.2d 416 (1950) (in-
dividual with cerebral palsy treated as mentally incapacitated).
14. A few statutes provide that time spent in a public institution does not
count toward the acquisition of a settlement in that locality. IOWA CODE ANN. §
252.16(3) (1949); S.D. CODE § 50.0102(1) (Supp. 1952). On the ground that
settlement cannot be gained by virtue of a coerced residence, this also seems to be
the rule in the absence of statute. Town of Freeport v. Board of Supervisors of
Stephenson County, 41 Ill. 495 (1866); Town of Northfield v. Town of Vershire,
33 Vt. *110 (1860) (imprisonment); cf. Township of Equality v. Township of
Star, 200 Minn. 316, 274 N.W. 219 (1937).
15. CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE §§ 2555(b), 2556 (1952) (public institution);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-147 (g) (Burns 1951) (penal, charitable, and related institu-
tions) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 116, §§ 2, 5 (1949) (similar); MICa. STAT. ANN. §
16.455(a-1) (2) (Supp. 1953) (public institution); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.07(2)(Supp. 1954) (various named public and private institutions); NEB. REv. STAT. §
68-115(2) (Supp. 1953) ("public or private charitable or penal institution"); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-5 (d), (e) (Supp. 1953) ("charitable, custodial or correctional
institution"); N.Y. SocL WELFARE LAW § 118 (various named public and private
institutions); N.D. REv. CODE § 50-0205 (1943) (public institutions); Vt. Laws1953, No. 58, at 40 (various named public and private institutions) ; Wis. STAT. §
49.10 (4) (1953) (while institutionalized as public charge).16. The Connecticut court has held that time spent in mental institutions andprisons cannot be counted toward the period required for a settlement by resi-
dence in the locality from which the individual was committed. Town of Chaplin
v. Town of Bloomfield, 92 Conn. 395, 103 At. 118 (1918) (mental institu-tion); Town of Reading v. Town of Westport, 19 Conn. *561 (1849) (imprison-
ment). These cases rely in part on the point that as an institutionalized non-
resident is not subject to removal it is impossible to prevent his acquisition of a
settlement. Contra, Inhabitants of Topsham v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 74 Me.236 (1882) (imprisonment). The Maine court handled the problem as it wouldany case involving an absence from a locality in which a settlement by residenceis sought. For a similar approach, see Town of Northfield v. Town of ershire, 33Vt. *11 (1860) (settlement not interrupted by imprisonment in local jail while
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which hold that time in an institution may not be counted toward
settlement seem influenced in part by the coerced nature of the in-
dividual's habitation during the period of confinement. Since this
situation is really another facet of the problem of absence from a
locality, 7 it is difficult to understand why it should be singled out for
separate treatment rather than governed by the general rules relating
to absence. It might be suspected that mentally incapacitated and
institutionalized persons are not permitted to acquire a settlement
because these people are likely to become dependent on relief.
Rceipt of Relief
A similar and equally important problem arises in connection with
the individual who has received some form of public assistance during
the statutory residence period. While in the absence of an explicit
statutory provision it has been indicated that the receipt of relief
does not disqualify an individual from acquiring a settlement, there
are early decisions to the contrary.15 The reasoning of the early cases
is that a person receiving assistance is not capable of performing the
necessary duties of an inhabitant of the community. The decisions
also appear to have been influenced by the traditional view that a per-
son receiving relief is subject to the control of the relief authorities
and therefore is not a free agent." Whether the courts have aban-
doned such notions seems highly problematical.
awaiting trial). The result of this case may have been changed by statute. See
note 15 -upra. See also D IE. REV. STAT. C. 94, § 3 (1954).
For a case concerning a related problem, see Acosta v. County of San Diego,
126 Cal. Aprp. 2d 455, 272 P.2d 92 (1954), 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 143 (Indian residing
on federal reservation may acquire settlement by residence). Contra, Wis. STAT.
§ 49.10(4) (1953). See also Town of Salisbury v. Town of Fairfield, 1 Root 131(Conn. 1789) (person living with zuardian does not acquire settlement).
17. Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in General Assistance, 1955 WASH.U.L.Q. -55, 372-75,
18. For a case indicating that in the absence of an explicit statutory provision
the receipt of relief does not disqualify an individual from obtaining a settlement
by residence, see Barton County v. Stafford County, 133 Kan. 494, 1 P.2d 80(1931). See also Belknap County v. Carroll County, 13 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1940),
implying that the receipt of relief does not prevent the acquisition of a transitory
county residence under the New Hampshire law. Contra, Inhabitants of West
Newbury v. Inhabitants of Bradford, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 428 (1841) Inhabitants
of Brewster v. Inhabitants of Dennis, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 233 (1838); East
Sudbury v. Sudbury, 29 Iass. (12 Pick.) *2 (1832); Town of Croydon v. County
of Sulli'van, 47 N.H. 179 (1866).
By the same token, the voluntary furnishing of aid by a locality does not estop
it from denying that the individual helped has a settlement, since the locality may
simply have been fulfilling its statutory duty toward nonresidents. However, the
courts may construe such facts as an admission by the locality that the individual
had a settlement within its borders. Town of Canaan v. Town of Hanover, 47 N.H.
215 (1866); Thornton v. Campton, 18 N.H. 20 (1845); Stillwater v. Green, 9
N.J.L. 59 (Sup. Ct. 1827); Town of Danville v. Town of Hartford, 73 Vt. 300,
50 AtT. 1082 (1901). Conceivably, a court could mitigate the effects of the relief
disqualification by freely finding admissions of settlement in cases where aid had
been given voluntarily.
19. Cf. Freeport v. Board of Stephenson County, 41 Ill. 495 (1866) ; Randolph
v. Town of Greenwood, 122 Ill. App. 23 (1905).
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While a few statutes seem to have dropped this disqualification"
almost one-half of the settlement laws contain provisions to the effect
that a person receiving relief may not acquire a settlement.21 Al-
though the courts have not explicated the purpose behind laws of the
latter type, the cases interpreting these statutes can be reconciled
only on the basis suggested above-that the real purpose of the statu-
tory requirement is to prevent the acquisition of settlement by the
marginal income group from which persons needing assistance are
most likely to come. This may also explain those decisions which have
incorporated this disqualification even in the absence of an express
statutory provision.
The effect of this disqualification may be best emphasized by a sur-
vey of the Wisconsin decisions. Formerly, the Wisconsin statute pro-
vided that any person "supported as a pauper" was disqualified from
acquiring a settlement. A similar provision is still found in a few
states.2 2 Under this provision the Wisconsin court made it clear that
neither the source from which the support came, whether from volun-
tary agencies, friends, or relatives, nor the amount of that support
was controlling. Instead, whether the individual who had received
help was disqualified depended upon his status at the time he was
supported.23 The consequences of such an approach are illustrated
20. Some states, New York for example, appear to have repealed their pro-
visions disqualifying an individual who receives relief with the aim of eliminating
this disability to the acquisition of a settlement. Illinois and Montana have
adopted variants of this approach and authorize the acquisition of settlement in
the locality in which the individual is residing at the time he applies for assistance
even though he receives assistance during the statutory residence period. These
provisions apply to persons already having a state residence. ILL. ANN. STAT. C.23, § 439-6 (Supp. 1954); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 71-302 (1953).
21. CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 2555 (b) (1952) ("relief or support"); CONN.GEN. STAT. §§ 2575-76 (1949) ("shall have maintained himself and family" dur-
ing the period of residence); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-147 (d) (Burns 1951) ("sup-ported... as an indigent person"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.16 (3) (1949)("supported by pubic funds"); ME. REV. STAT. e. 94, § 1 (VI) (1954) ("with-
out receiving supplies as a pauper") ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 116, § 2 (1949)("while receiving public relief"); MIcE. STAT. ANN. § 16.455(a-1) (2) (Supp.1953) (state residence, like Caifornia) ; Micu. STAT. ANN. § 16.121 (Supp. 1953)(local residence, "without receiving any public relief or assistance"); MINN. STAT.ANN. § 261.07 (2) (West Supp. 1954) (poor reief and other types of assistance) ;Nna. REV. STAT. § 68-115(2) (Supp. 1953) (poor relief or "state assistance");
N.H. REV. LAws c. 123, § 7 (1942) ('while assisted as a pauper"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 44:8A-5 (Supp. 1954) (public aid or assistance); N.D. REv. CODE § 50-0205 (1943) (similar to New Jersey); Omo REv. CODE § 5113.05 (Supp. 1955)("poor relief"); S.C. CODE § 71-152(4) (1952) (similar to Connecticut); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-5-60 (8) (1953) (by indigent person while recipient of "charity");
VT. REV. STAT. § 7105 (1947) (relief); WIs. STAT. § 49.10(4) (1953) (without
receipt of "aid" under general assistance chapter except where otherwise pro-
vided).
22. See statutes of Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, and Utah cited in note 21
supraL
23. Milwaukee County v. Village of Stratford, 245 Wis. 505, 15 N.W.2d 812(1944); Town of Ellington v. Industrial Commission, 225 Wis. 169, 273 N.W. 5301937) (support from relatives); Town of Rolling v. City of Antigo, 211 Wis. 220,
248 N.W. 119 (1933) (marginal family supported by voluntary association); City
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by the case of Town of Saukville v. Town of Grafton.24 The individual
in question had not received public aid for a length of time consider-
ably in excess of the statutory residence period, during which he had
worked as a hired hand for one individual. But, having previously
received public relief, when he again fell in need the court held that
he had not acquired a settlement because he was a "pauper" depen-
dent on "charity" all during the time he was self-employed. However,
this approach to the problem may well be altered by the present
Wisconsin statute which provides that the "time spent by a person in
any municipality while supported therein as a dependent person . . .
shall not be included as part of the year necessary to acquire or lose
a settlement."' 5
Other jurisdictions have accomplished practically the same result
as that reached in the Saukville case. They have allowed the relief ad-
ministrator, by granting present relief to the individual concerned, to
decide, in effect, who is to be later disqualified in the acquisition of a
settlement. For example, as the relief official has the authority to ex-
tend aid whenever the need for it arises, a grant of assistance upon
the application of the father of the person in need will prevent the
acquisition of settlement by the person in need.2 6 Also, it is not neces-
sary that the latter be aware that he is receiving aid as a "pauper."
This will be presumed from the fact that the recipient is a needy
individual who has in fact received such aid.2 7 Even more significant,
the courts have disregarded the fact that at the time relief was given
of Port Washington v. Town of Saukville, 62 Wis. 454, 22 N.W. 717 (1885). It
may be noted, however, that the apparent harshness of this approach may be
mitigated in certain cases. For example, in the case last cited the fact that the
individuals in question had received public help in the small amount of $1.67 was
relied on as evidence to support a finding that they had not been supported as
paupers. Furthermore, it appears that support from relatives is not considered
disqualifying in the usual case.
24. 68 Wis. 192, 31 N.W. 719 (1887). While this is an old case, it does not
seem out of line with more recent pronouncements by the Wisconsin court.
25. Wis. STAT. § 49.10(4) (1953).
26. Town of Weston v. Town of Wallingford, 52 Vt. 630 (1880). The Maine
statute provides that relief must be applied for by the applicant himself or by
some peison "authorized" by him. ME. REv. STAT. c. 94, § 2 (1954). The statute
has been interpreted to mean that the wife, as well as the husband, may apply on
behalf of the family. Inhabitants of Sebec v. Inhabitants of Foxcroft, 67 Me. 491(1877). The courts also seem to have held that the receipt of relief is disqualify-
ing regardless of the place in which it is given. Randolph v. Town of Greenwood,
122 Ill. App. 23 (190.5) ; Inhabitants of Oakham v. Inhabitants of Warwick, 95
Mass. (12 Alien) 88 (1866); Gilmanton v. Sanbornton, 56 N.H. 336 (1876).
27. Town of Bridgewater v. Town of Roxbury, 54 Conn. 213, 6 Atl. 415 (1886).
But cf. ME. REV. STAT. C. 94, § 2 (1954) (recipient must receive assistance "with a
full knowledge"). The construction put upon the Maine statute seems similar to
that adopted by the Connecticut court in the absence of a statute. Inhabitants of
Linneus v. Inhabitants of Sidney, 70 Me. 114 (1879); ef. Town of Wallingford v.
Town of Southington, 16 Conn. 431 (1844). The sum claimed to have been given
as relief must actually have been expended by the locality. Town of Randolph v.
City of Barre, 116 Vt. 557, 80 A.2d 537 (1951).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the recipient was able or had promised to repay the amount received.2
However, an individual who can pay for assistance could be said not
to have received it at all. The fact that he was given assistance may,
of course, indicate that he is the type of person who may need relief
again and thus prompt the courts to hold that this interrupts the
acquisition of a settlement.
The courts, other than the Wisconsin court, seem to have arrived
at conflicting conclusions in situations which do not clearly fall
within the statute. For example, the courts are divided on the point
whether private relief or the receipt of relief from relatives amounts
to the receipt of indirect public relief under the statute.2  Some
statutes now expressly include private relief as a basis for denial of
settlement.0 There does seem to be a tendency to disregard insub-
stantial amounts of public aid given to an individual, especially if
it is given to reimburse particular items of indebtedness.3 1 In light
28. Inhabitants of Norwich v. Inhabitants of Saybrook, 5 Conn. 384 (1824)(by inference); Inhabitants of Bar Harbor v. Inhabitants of Town of Jonesport,
133 Me. 345, 177 Atl. 614 (1935) ; Veazie v. Chester, 53 Me. 29 (1864). But see
Town of Montpelier v. Town of Calais, 5 Vt. 572 (1833). Receipt of relief is not
disqualifying in Massachusetts if the recipient tenders reimbursement within two
years. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 116, § 2 (1949). This provision has created doubts as
to the location of an individual's settlement during the two-year grace period. Cf.
Inhabitants of Dedham v. Inhabitants of Milton, 136 Mass. 424 (1884). If fraud
can be shown, of course, the giving of relief will not affect the acquisition of a
settlement. See note 31 infra.
29. That casual assistance does not constitute the receipt of relief, see Standish
v. Windham, 10 Me. 97 (1833) (support by son); Inhabitants of Wiscasset v. In-
habitants of Waldoborough, 3 Me. 388 (1825) (support by brother); Summit
County v. Trumbull County, 116 Ohio St. 663, 158 N.E. 172 (1927) (under prior
law, support by private organizations). Contra, Town of Manchester v. Town of
Townshend, 110 Vt. 136, 2 A.2d 207 (1938), in which support from a trust fund
established by a private benefactor for the relief of the poor of the town was in-
directly held to be the equivalent of general relief. See also Town of Cavendish
v. Town of Mt. Holly, 48 Vt. 525 (1876), in which the support given by a town in
return for a conveyance of a farm was held not to be public relief on the ground
that it was rendered pursuant to contract. Conceivably, this case could be inter-
preted to mean that relief given in return for a voluntary lien on the recipient's
property is also given pursuant to contract. All of these cases involve more than
casual assistance from private sources.
30. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.455 (a-i) (2) (Supp. 1953) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-
115(2) (Supp. 1953); OHIO REV. CODE § 5113.05 (Supp. 1955). The Michigan
statute makes an exception for support received from legally responsible relatives.
31. See County of Grand Forks v. DuFault, 66 N.D. 518, 267 N.W. 136 (1936)(receipt of free medication consisting of a jar of salve held not to constitute
relief). In some of the cases the locality had reimbursed a private individual; the
courts relied on the rule that aid voluntarily given by a third person without
expectation of reimbursement does not constitute relief. Inhabitants of Lebanon
v. Inhabitants of Hebron, 6 Conn. 45 (1825) (advancement by locality to woman
to prosecute putative father of child eventually reimbursed by father); Inhab-
itants of Hampden v. City of Bangor, 68 Me. 368 (1878) (reimbursement of pri-
vate householder voluntarily boarding relief applicant for a few days); Inhab-
itants of Canaan v. Inhabitants of Bloomfield, 3 Me. 172 (1824) (third party
voluntarily filled store order not made out to him); cf. In re Kelly, 46 Misc. 548,
95 N.Y. Supp. 53 (County Ct. 1905). But cf. In re Settlement of Youngquist, 203
Minn. 530, 282 N.W. 272 (1938).
In some of these cases the element of fraud seemed to be present, i.e., one of
the localities furnished relief with the intent of preventing the individual from
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of the judicial decisions concerning the acquisition of a settlement,
it might have been expected that the courts would find any of the
circumstances mentioned above indicative of a dependent status and
therefore disqualifying.
The purpose of a statute denying settlement to persons receiving
relief is also put in question when an individual receiving a grant
under one of the categorical assistance programs suddenly requires
medical assistance or other help from general assistance. While these
categorical grants are aimed at preventing destitution, they are also
awarded to fulfill other public objectives. The aid to dependent chil-
dren program, for example, helps preserve the unity of families in
which the father is no longer present by preventing the necessity of
the mother's going to work, thus lessening the possibility that the
children will be dispersed to other homes3 2 Perhaps it is because of
this dual purpose behind such assistance that the courts are divided
in their treatment of aid to dependent children and other categorical
)enefits.- There are a few statutes which equate them with general
assistance., On the related problem of the disqualification for settle-
acquiring a settlement within its borders. This circumstance may serve as thebasis for disregarding the relief that has been awarded. See Town of Weston v.Town of Wallingford, 52 Vt. 630, 631 (1880). But cf. Inhabitants of Orland v.
Inhabitants of Penobscot, 97 Me. 29, 53 At!. 830 (1902) ; Inhabitants of Foxcroft
v. Inhabitants of Corinth, 61 Me. 559 (1873); Oakham v. Sutton, 54 Mass. 192(1847).
The fact that public relief is received indirectly, however, does not alter its
character. Inhabitants of Lee v. Inhabitants of Winn, 75 Me. 465 (1883) (use offarm owned by town); Inhabitants of Hampden v. Inhabitants of Levant, 59 Me.557 (1871) (indirect receipt of relief by member of family unit); SheboyganCounty v. Town of Sheboygan Falls, 130 Wis. 93, 109 N.W. 1030 (1906) (same).Of course, the relief must have been properly awarded by the authorized officials.
See Inhabitants of Fort Fairfield v. Inhabitants of Millinocket, 136 Me. 426, 12
A.2d 173 (1940).
32. See ABBOTT, FROM RELIEF TO SOCIAL SEcTRITY 263-89 (1941). See also the
comments of the court in Town of Cohasset v. Town of Scituate, 309 Mass. 402, 34
N.E.2d 699 (1941).
33. The Iowa court appears to have held that support from "public funds"
under its statute does not include old age assistance. Warren County v. DecaturCounty, 232 Iowa 613, 5 N.W.2d 847 (1942). Most of the cases, however, involve
aid to dependent children or state programs of a similar nature antedating the
enactment of the federal statute authorizing grants for this purpose. For casesholding that aid of this type is the equivalent of poor relief, see Moscow Borough
Poor District's Appeal, 119 Pa. Super. 533, 180 At!. 718 (1935) (under priorlaw); Milwaukee County v. Waukesha County, 236 Wis. 233, 294 N.W. 835(1940). Contra, Town of Hagen v. Town of Felton, 197 Minn. 567, 267 N.W. 484(1936) (under prior statute); In re Settlement of Skog, 186 Minn. 349, 243 N.W.
384 (1932) (under prior statute); Town of St. Johnsbury v. Town of Lyndon, 180
At]. 892 (Vt. 1935).
34. The problem presented in note 33 supra has now been handled by statutory
changes in each of these jurisdictions. Pennsylvania has repealed its provision
disqualifying persons who receive relief from acquiring a settlement. The rule of
the Wisconsin case has been confirmed by a statute equating all of the categorical
programs with general relief. WIs. STAT. § 49.10(4) (1953). The rule of the
Minnesota case has been reversed by a statute equating all but the aid to the blind
program with general relief. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.07(2) (West Supp. 1954).The Vermont statute now provides explicitly that categorical assistance is not the
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ment purposes of the person liable for the support of the institutional-
ized individual, the courts have held that the public support of a mem-
ber of one's family in a public institution is the equivalent of general
relief.25 They have rejected the suggestion that this situation should be
distinguished because of the fact that other public purposes besides
the relief of destitution are served by confinement. In this day and
age, in which many groups receive loans and grants from government
in aid of various public objectives, it is difficult to see why the receipt
of categorical benefits, for example, should be considered the receipt
of "relief." As well might it be contended that a person living in a
low-rent public housing project constructed with the aid of a federal
grant is receiving relief on the ground that the rent he pays is reduced
by the amount of the federal subsidy.36
equivalent of general relief. VT. REV. STAT. § 7105 (1947). For a provision sim-
ilar to the Wisconsin statute, see Me. Laws 1953, c. 249. See also S.D. CODE §
50.0102-1 (Supp. 1952).
A similar problem arose during the depression with reference to persons re-
ceiving direct or work relief under one of the federal emergency relief programs.
Most of the courts held that either type of relief was the equivalent of general
assistance. Application of Dibble, 261 App. Div. 346, 25 N.Y.S.2d 571 (3d Dep't
1941); In re Youngs, 172 Misc. 155, 14 N.Y.S.2d 800 (County Ct. 1939); Ward
County v. Ankenbauer, 65 N.D. 220, 257 N.W. 474 (1934). The Pennsylvania
Superior Court, however, taking cognizance of the fact that great numbers of
people ordinarily able to support themselves were forced to rely on the federal
program, held that such persons did not have the status of "paupers" and there-
fore were not disqualified from obtaining a settlement under the Pennsylvania
statute. In re Commitment of Dennis, 5 A.2d 406 (Pa. Super. 1939). The rule of
the New York cases was eventually codified by a statute, now repealed.
The Minnesota court at first held that the receipt of federal aid was not dis-
qualifying because it was not technically "relief from the poor fund of a county"
as required by the statute then in effect. In re Settlement of Wrobleski, 204 Minn.
264, 283 N.W. 399 (1939). This rule was eventually changed by the statute cited
above. For the application of this statute, see In re Settlement of Hansen, 206
Minn. 371, 288 N.W. 706 (1939); In re Settlement of Blackwell, 205 Minn. 262,
285 N.W. 613 (1939). The Wisconsin statute cited above also equates federal,
state, or local work relief with general assistance. It was interpreted to apply to
employment with the WPA, City of Madison v. Dane County, 236 Wis. 145, 294
N.W. 544 (1940), but not with the CCC, Milwaukee County v. City of Hurley, 245
Wis. 77, 13 N.W.2d 520 (1944). The court reasoned that the CCC program had
purposes, such as soil conservation and forest preservation, that distinguished it
from ordinary public assistance. See Annot., 120 A.L.R. 621 (1939).35. Treasurer & Receiver General v. Town of Natick, 320 Mass. 715, 71 N.E.2d
225 (1947) ; Treasurer & Receiver General v. Town of Dedham, 300 Mass. 238, 15
N.E.2d 252 (1938); City of Charleston v. Inhabitants of Groveland, 81 Mass. 15(1860); Milwaukee County v. Oconto County, 235 Wis. 601, 294 N.W. 11 (1940).
The Massachusetts statute provides that institutional aid to veterans and their
dependents does not affect the acquisition of settlement. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 116,§ 4 (Supp. 1954), applied in Treasurer & Receiver General v. Natick, supra. For
a statute to the contrary, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-5(i) (Supp. 1954). Simi-
larly, the receipt of veterans' aid does not affect the acquisition of a settlement
under the Massachusetts statute. MASS. ANN. LAws c. 116, § 2 (1949). For a de-
cision to the contrary in the absence of statute, see Juneau County v. Wood
County, 109 Wis. 330, 85 N.W. 387 (1901). See also the statutes cited in note 15
supra which disqualify an institutionalized individual regardless of whether he is
receiving public support.
36. For a discussion of the subsidy principle in this field, see Riesenfeld &
Eastlund, Public Aid to Housing and Land Redevelopment, 34 MINN. L. REV. 610(1950).
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Another rule applicable to the receipt of relief which has the effect
of reducing the number of persons capable of acquiring a settlement
involves an application of the family responsibility concept. A few
of the statutes provide that the individual must support himself and
his "family" in order to acquire a settlement.37 Even in the absence
of such a provision the courts have held that, if the duty to support
the dependent person who receives aid exists either under the family
responsibility statute or at common law, the aid is considered to have
been given to the responsible relative who should have provided the
help.- While the rule may be justified if the person receiving aid is a
member of the relative's immediate family and is in fact dependent
on him, it is difficult to understand why the rule is to be applied to
situations in which this is not the case. While it has been held that
aid given to a dependent person who has been abandoned by the re-
sponsible relative is still aid to the relative,39 there is authority to the
contrary based on the ground that the relative need not support an
In Marshall County v. Anoka County, 212 Minn. 127, 2 N.W.2d 816 (1942), an
outright grant to a farmer from the former Federal Resettlement Administration
to help meet costs which resulted from the destruction of crops by the elements
was held not to constitute the giving of relief. But cf. Opinion of the Justices, 120
N.E.24 198 (Mass. 1954), upholding the constitutionality of a Massachusetts
statute authorizing local authorities to build housing, apparently to rent at a rate
below the market figure, for older persons in the lower economic groups. The
court proinf d out that this legislation, like old age assistance, was simply another
form if rl'i4f for the needy. See also Vt. REV. STAT. § 7105 (1947), explicitly
providiria that unemployment insurance and federal social security benefits do
not constitute relief.
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2575 (1949) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-5(c) (Supp.
1953) (aid to wife or minor child for whose support the individual is "respon-
sible") ; OHIO RE,. CODE § 5113.05 (Baldwin Supp. 1954) (aid to wife or minor
children ;n another state); S.C. CODE § 71-152(4) (1952) ; VT. REv. STAT. §§ 7097,
7105 (1947),
38. Inhabitants of Taunton v. Inhabitants of Middleborough, 53 Mass. (12
Met.) 35 (1847); Town of Croydon v. County of Sullivan, 47 N.H. 179 (1866);
Stocklein v. Priddy, 31 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 369 (Prob. Ct. 1934); Dane County v.
Barron County, 249 Wis. 618, 26 N.W.2d 249 (1947). However, if the duty to
support does not exist, the receipt of aid by the dependent person does not dis-
qualifY the relative alleged to be responsible. Gleason v. Boston, 144 Mass. 25, 10
N.E. 476 (1887) (wife has no duty to support minor children); Inhabitants of
Brookfield v. Inhabitants of Warren, 128 Mass. 287 (1880) (no duty to support
stepchildren) ; Town of Manchester v. Town of Rupert, 6 Vt. 291 (1834) (no duty
to support daughter-in-law).
It should be noted that the cumulative effect of the rules applicable to the
receipt of relief is to disqualify individuals who come from families having a
marginal status, whether they themselves are marginal or not. That is, an in-
dividual may be disqualified from acquiring a settlement either if he receives
support from a relative or if he provides support to a relative.
39. Town of Cheshire v. Town of Burlington, 31 Conn. 326 (1863); Inhabitants
of Norwich v. Inhabitants of Saybrook, 5 Conn. 384 (1824). The following de-
cisions also seem to have adopted this view: North Dakota v. Kambitz, 65 N.D.
260, 258 N.W. 116 (1934); Stocklein v. Priddy, 31 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 369 (Prob. Ct.
1934) ; Town of Tunbridge v. Town of Norwich, 17 Vt. 493 (1845) ; Dane County
v. Barron County, 249 Wis. 618, 26 N.W.2d 249 (1947). The Connecticut and
Vermont decisions were influenced by statutory provisions requiring the individual
seeking to acquire a settlement to support himself and his family. See the statutes
cited in note :37 supra.
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individual who is no longer under his care and protection0 or who
receives aid without his knowledge.41 The view first stated might be
preferred if it is felt that a person ought not to be able to avoid the
consequences of aid to his family simply by not fulfilling his obliga-
tions. If, however, it is felt that the fault for breakdowns in family
relationships cannot be placed solely on one of the individuals in-
volved,42 then it might be better to adopt the view that the aid to the
dependent does not constitute aid to the responsible relative.
It has been noted that a person who once receives relief may well
need it again and that this fact has probably prompted statutes ex-
cluding the period during which relief is received from the residence
period necessary to acquire a settlement. To use this evidence of
dependent status as a device to prevent the acquisition of a settlement
does not seem fair or desirable. Indeed, the fact that an individual has
received aid from any one community for any length of time may
be evidence that he has a home there.43
Assuming, however, that the receipt of relief or any other form of
personal incapacity disqualifies an individual from acquiring a settle-
ment, the question then presented is the effect of the disqualification.
In view of the fact that most of the settlement statutes require a con-
tinuous residence, it could be argued that personal incapacity inter-
rupts the acquisition of a settlement so that the statutory residence
period must begin anew once the disability has been removed. The
40. Inhabitants of Islesborough v. Inhabitants of Lincolnville, 76 Me. 572(1885); City of Lewiston v. Inhabitants of Harrison, 69 Me. 504 (1879); Inhab-
itants of Eastport v. Inhabitants of Lubec, 64 Me. 244 (1873); Inhabitants of
Bangor v. Inhabitants of Readfield, 32 Me. 60 (1850); Inhabitants of Green v.
Inhabitants of Buckfield, 3 Me. *136 (1824). The Maine court seemed to be in-
fluenced by the fact that the statute did not contain a provision requiring the in-
dividual to support his family. For the duty of support to cease, the court requires
a complete abandonment by the parent whether with or without cause.
The Maine view also appears to have been adopted by the following cases:
Town of Croydon v. County of Sullivan, 47 N.H. 179 (1866); Scranton Poor
District v. Directors of the Poor, 106 Pa. 446 (1884); Damascus v. Buckingham,
3 Pa. Dist. 744 (Q.S. 1894). When the Pennsylvania cases were decided there was
no statutory provision disqualifying an individual who received relief. The
opinions seem based in part on the theory that in the absence of such a provision
the receipt of relief would not be disqualifying.
41. City of Worcester v. City of Springield, 310 Mass 217 37 N.E.2d 480(1941) ; Inhabitants of Wareham v. Inhabitants of Milford, 105 Mass. 293 (1870) ;
Inhabitants of Berkeley v. Inhabitants of Taunton, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 480(1837). In the usual case of an abandonment it would be expected that the
responsible relative would not know that aid had been extended.42. See HAMILTON, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIAL CASEwoRK 276 (2d
ed. 1951).
43. The courts are always at liberty to find an estoppel to deny settlement in
this situation. See note 18 supra. Mention should also be made of the Illinois
plan under which an individual acquires a settlement in the community in which
he receives relief after having resided there six months. Prior to that time the
cost of relief is borne by his previous place of settlement. This scheme helps
mitigate the impact of migrant relief costs on communities attracting large num-
bers of new residents. See ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, § 439-6 (Supp. 1954). See also
the Montana statute in note 20 supra.
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other possible position is that the period of personal incapacity is to
be excluded, but that a settlement may be acquired by tacking together
the period preceding and the period subsequent to incapacity. It
would be expected that the solution to this problem would be handled
by an explicit legislative provision. While some of the statutes have
adopted the rule that personal incapacity interrupts the acquisition of
a settlement," and others appear to have adopted the noncontinuous
approach,- most of the statutes seem to have left the question unre-
solved. In the absence of a statutory provision the courts seem inclined
to adopt the noncontinuous view.-, This appears fortunate because
if personal incapacity interrupted the acquisition of a settlement the
individuals involved might never be able to acquire one. This would
particularly be true of persons who have to apply for relief from time
to time.
In sunnary, then, personal incapacity of the type above described
may operate to prevent or impede the acquisition of a settlement. For
the reasons that have been stated, it is hard to justify the retention
of these disqualifications.
LOSS OF ACQUIRED SETTLEMENTS
The rules regarding the acquisition of settlements are mitigated by
the prevailing rule that in the absence of a statute a settlement cannot
be lost until a new one has been acquiredY.4  This rule seems to spring
from the concept that settlement is the equivalent of domicile, and it
44. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2575 (1949); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.16(3) (1949);N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-5 (Supp. 1954) (state residence); N.D. REV. CODE § 50-
0205 (1943), changing the rule in Eddy County v. Wells County, 73 N.D. 33, 11N.W.2d 60 (1943). Only the New Jersey and North Dakota statutes may be said
to be fully explicit on this point.
45. CAL, WELFARE & INST. CODE § 2555(b) (1953) amended by CAL. WEL-
FARE &INST. CODE § 2555(a) (Supp. 1955); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-147(d) (Burns
1951); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-6 (Supp. 1954) (municipal residence); N.Y.
SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 118. Only the New York law is fully explicit on this point.
46. Commonwealth v. Boston, 316 Mass. 410, 55 N.E.2d*686 (1944). This also
seems to be the rule in Minnesota. Minneapolis v. County of Beltrami, 206 Minn.371, 288 N.W. 706 (1939) ; In re Venteicher, 202 Minn. 331, 278 N.W. 581 (1938).
See the discussion of the Minnesota cases in JACOBSON, PUBLIC RELIEF AND LEGAL
SETTLEMENT IN MINNESOTA 74 (1945). But cf. Town of Scott v. Town of Clayton,
51 W is. 185, 8 N.W. 171 (1881) ; Audubon County v. Vogessor, 228 Iowa 281, 291
N.W. 1: 5 (1940) (.snzble).
47. Town of Newtown v. Town of Southbury, 100 Coun. 251, 123 Atl. 278(1924); Norwich v. Windham, 1 Root 232 (Conn. 1790); County of Richland v.
Township of Decker, 275 Il. App. 220 (1934); Inhabitants of Phillips v. Inhab-itants of Kingfield, 19 le. 375 (1841); Inhabitants of Brookfield v. Inhabitants of
Holden, 247 Mass. 577, 142 N.E. 784 (1924); County of Ramsey v. Township ofLake Henry 234 Minn. 119, 47 N.W.2d 554 (1951); Parker City v. Du Bois
Borough, 9 Ait!. 457 (Pa. 1887) ; Anderson v. Miller, 120 Pa. Super. 463, 182 Atl.
742 (1936); Braintrim Township v. Windham Township, 10 Pa. County Ct. 250(Q.S. 1891); Town of Manchester v. Town of Springfield, 15 Vt. *385 (1843);
Town of Scott v. Town of Clayton, 51 Wis. 185, 8 N.W. 171 (1881). This also
appears to have been the rule under the English law. Rex v. Inhabitants of St.
Botolph, Say. 198, 96 Eng. Rep. 851 (K.B. 1766). The North Carolina statute
restates the common-law rule. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-159(5) (1952), applied in
McDowell County v. Forsyth County, 121 N.C. 295, 28 S.E. 412 (1897).
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will be remembered that everybody must have a domicile somewhere.
However, it is not correct to say that as a consequence of this rule
everybody must have a settlement, because the rule does not help an
individual who has never acquired a settlement in the first place.4 18
In addition, statutes presently exist in many jurisdictions which
alter the rule just stated. These statutes apply to state or local settle-
ments and typically provide that a settlement may be lost by an ab-
sence from the state or locality for a stated period, usually one year.
The statutes differ, however, regarding the nature of the absence that
will constitute a loss of settlement. Some simply provide that an "ab-
sence" or "removal" from the state for the statutory period will
suffice, 49 others add the requirement that the absence must be "wil-
ful"1;0 or "continuous."' 51
48. Under this rule, however, it should be emphasized that a settlement cannot,
in truth, be abandoned once it has been acquired. It will merely shift when the
individual acquires a new one. See Town of Roxbury v. Town of Bridgewater, 85
Conn. 196, 82 Atl. 193 (1912); Fayette County v. Bremer County, 56 Iowa 516,
9 N.W. 372 (1881); Inhabitants of Friendship v. Inhabitants of Bristol, 132 Me.
285, 170 Atl. 496 (1934); Grove City v. Township of Manannah, 182 Minn. 197,
233 N.W. 875 (1930). Potential applicants are helped even more by the rule in
some states, in the absence of statute, that a settlement is not forfeited by the
acquisition of a new settlement in another state. Payne v. Town of Dunham, 29
Ill. 125 (1862) ; Inhabitants of Canton v. Bentley, 11 Mass. *441 (1814) ; Landaff
v. Atkinson, 8 N.H. 532 (1837); Township of Alexandria v. Township of King-
wood, 8 N.J.L. 370 (Sup. Ct. 1826) ; cf. Town of Granville v. Town of Hancock, 69
Vt. 205, 37 At. 294 (1896). This rule appears to be based on the notion that settle-
ment is a local question and therefore the court cannot take notice of settlement
acquired under the laws of another "sovereign." Some decisions, however, have
held to the contrary. Inhabitants of Middletown v. Inhabitants of Lyme, 5 Conn.
95 (1823); In -re Chapman, 15 Misc. 296, 37 N.Y. Supp. 763 (County Ct. 1895);
Juniata County v. Delaware Township, 107 Pa. 68 (1884); cf. Plumcreek Town-
ship v. Elderton Borough, 129 Pa. 626, 18 At. 549 (1889). These courts appear to
have taken cognizance of the realities of the situation.
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1093(c) (Supp. 1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.17(1949); N.H. REv. LAws c. 123, § 2 (1942); N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 117(1) ;
N.D. REv. CODE § 50-0206 (1943) (county residence); ORE. REV. STAT. § 411.720(3) (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-60(7) (1953) (local law); Wis. STAT. §
49.10(7) (1953). Many of these statutes, of which the New York statute is
typical, make an exception for absence in the armed forces or other government
service. For a typical case construing such a provision, see Inhabitants of Hart-.
land v. Inhabitants of Athens, 98 A.2d 542 (Me. 1953).
Some of the statutes also attempt to regulate the settlement status of recipients
of general assistance and other forms of public aid. Cf. Aniz. CODE ANN. § 70-
121 (Supp. 1952) (recipient leaving state may receive aid until settlement ac-
quired elsewhere, but not for period in excess of 5 years); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
46:110 (1950) (recipient may continue to get aid upon removal to another
parish); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 71-302 (1953) (persons "voluntarily" absent
from state not eligible for general assistance); S.D. CODE § 50.0102(7) (Supp.
1952) (recipient of any form of public assistance may not change settlement).
See also Town of Cordova v. Village of Le Sueur Center, 78 Minn. 36, 80 N.W.
836 (1899) (person receiving private relief may change settlement). In North
Dakota v. Perkins County, 69 S.D. 270, 9 N.W.2d 500 (1943), a statute providing
for the loss of a settlement by absence was challenged on constitutional grounds
which were impliedly rejected by the court.
50. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, § 436-10(b) (Supp. 1954); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-
147(f) (Burns 1951) (state residence); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.07(5) (Supp.
1954); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-115(4) (Supp. 1953); N.D. REV. CODE § 50-0207(1943); S.D. CODE § 50.0102(6) (Supp. 1952). See also WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
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Unfortunately, in dealing with statutes of this type the courts
sometimes confuse the loss of a prior settlement with the acquisition
of a new one?2 When, however, the courts have been aware that the
statutes require them to deal independently with the question of loss,
they have been faced with questions similar to those raised by inter-
ruptions due to absence or personal incapacity of the continuity re-
quired to gain a settlement. For example, the question whether the
acquisition of a settlement is interrupted by the temporary absence
of an individual has sometimes been solved by reference to his intent2?
Similarly, the courts have held that an absence for the prescribed
statutory period does not result in a loss of settlement if the requisite
intent to abandon the settlement is not present, even though the
statute does not explicitly require this ?*
In addition, one court has held that an individual does not lose his
settlement if he is mentally incapacitated during the period of absence
prescribed by the statute.5 The cases seem divided, however, on the
question whether the receipt of relief interrupts an absence." Both
25-123 (Supp. 1955) (recipient who moves to another state may continue to get
aid tf he "intends" to retain Wyoming residence).
51. AL. WLFARE: & INST. C oE § 2555(b) (Supp. 1955); KAN. GEN. STAT.
39-709a (Supn. 1953); ME. REV. STAT. c. 94, § 3 (1954); iW8s5. ANN. LAws C.I 16, § 5 (1949); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16455(a-1) (3) (Supp. 1953); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 44 :SA-8 (Supp. 19.54); OHIo REV. CODE § 5113.05 (Baldwin Supp. 1955);
VT. R11E. STAT. § 7097 (1947).
52, See eg., Town of Lakeville v. City of Cambridge, 305 MasS. 256, 25 N.E2d
757 (19405.
53. See Mandelker, The Settlement Requfrement in General Assistance, 1955
WAS', U.LQ, 355, 372-74.
54. Town of Lakeville v. City of Cambridge, 305 Mass. 256, 25 N.E.2d 7$?(1940); Town of Plymouth v. Town of Kingston 289 Mass. 57, 193 N.E. 576(1935) ; Waushara County v. Calumet County, 238 Wis. 280, 298 N.W. 613 (1941).
This also seems to be the holding in In re Boise, 73 N.D. 16, 11 N.W.2d 80 (1948);
Nelson County v. William County, 68 N.D. 56, 276 N.W. 265 (1937). Of course,
the individual must have been absent for the requisite statutory period. In the
Matter of Leslie, 166 Minn. 180, 207 N.W. 323 (1926).
It is of interest that not all of these cases have arisen in states which impose
the intent requirement as a prerequisite to the acquisition of a settlement. See
Mandelker, ,rapra note 53, at 369 n.55. Courts in these states, however, .might
hold that the absence necessary to lose a settlement, as well as the residence
necessary to gain one, must be permanent and not temporary. Such a holding
would be equivalent to a rule that an intent to abandon the settlement must be
shown. See Mandelker, mspra note 53, at 370 nX58.
5,5. !n re Mortensen, 68 S.D. 841, 2 N.W.2d 679 (1942). See MASS. Aw. LAws
c. 116, § 5 (1949) (time spent in public institution not counted toward the loss of
a settlement).
56. That the receipt of relief from the locality of settlement interrupts the
statutory period of absence, see Town of Scott v. Town of Clayton 51 Wis. 185,
8 NW, 171 (1881). Contra, People ex rel. May v. Maynard, 160 N.Y. 453 55 N.E.
9 (1899) (under prior law, absence not interrupted by receipt of relief from any
source ; latter of Hawks, 26 Misc. 359, 57 N.Y. Supp. 216 (County Ct. 189)(same), See also Wis. STAT. § 49,10(4) (1953).
There has been some statutory recognition of the rule that the receipt of aid
from the prior place of settlement will interrupt the period of absence under
the statute. See N.D. REV. CO § 50-0206 (1943). The North Dakota court has
held that the receipt of relief at any time interrupts the absence. Therefore, the
period of absence is held to begin one month after relief is furnished by the prior
settlement. Stutsman County v. Bowman County, 68 N.D. 699, 283 N.W. 179(1938) ; Griggs County v. County of Cass, 65 N.D. 608, 260 N.W. 417 (193$).
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views seem motivated by the possibilities of "dumping" should the
other position be adopted. For example, the Wisconsin court, in hold-
ing that the receipt of aid interrupts the loss of a settlement, pointed
out that, otherwise, the locality of settlement could shift the settle-
ment of the recipient simply by having him transported elsewhere."
Perhaps the best solution to this situation would be to allow the settle-
ment to shift after the period of absence has expired unless it could be
shown that either locality had attempted to procure or prevent the
change.5
8
Although the effect of statutes providing for the loss of settlement
without the acquisition of a new one may be mitigated by the rule
that an intent to abandon the previous settlement must be found in
addition to physical absence from the locality, it should be noted that
provisions like this in general assistance laws have created some of
the most difficult problems for migrants. Because of differences in the
settlement laws of the various jurisdictions it would be quite possible
to lose a settlement in one locality without gaining it elsewhere. This
result would be avoided if the rule that a settlement could not be lost
until another is gained were to be reinstated by statute in those juris-
dictions where it has been abandoned.
DERIVATIVE SETTLEMENTS: ACQUISITION AND Loss
General Nature of Derivative Settlements
This discussion has already noted a tendency to treat the problems
of settlement on a family basis. For example, the courts have im-
ported the concept of family responsibility when determining whether
the receipt of relief by members of a family will count as the receipt
of relief by the head of the family. In part, this seems to have resulted
from the fact that the application for general assistance is made on a
family basis. It may also be a consequence of the law of domestic
relations, which has merged the legal personalities of the wife and
minor children into that of the father. This doctrine has also given
rise to the rules regarding acquired domiciles and by this indirect
route to the concept of a derivative settlement. 9 The principal effect
of this application of the merger doctrine is that the settlements of
the members of a family are traced to its head.
57. Town of Scott v. Town of Clayton, supra note 56. On the other hand, the
New York cases cited in note 56 supra pointed out that if the receipt of relief
interrupted the statutory period required for loss of settlement, the locality in
which the individual was physically residing could prevent the change simply by
giving relief and then charging it back to the locality of settlement..
58. For a holding that a settlement does not shift if the change has been pro-
cured fraudulently, see Inhabitants of Stratford v. Inhabitants of Fairfield, 3
Conn. 588 (1820). See also Town of Leicester v. Town of Brandon, 65 Vt. 544,
27 Atl. 318 (1893).
59. See GOODRICH, CONFLCT OF LAWS § 34 (3d -J 1WCL) (domicile of married
women).
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Although there was no provision in the first English settlement
law"° providing for derivative settlements, the English courts appear
to have incorporated this concept into the statute at an early date.-'
The courts have also read this principle into the American settlement
laws" and several of the American statutes now contain explicit statu-
tory provisions regulating the subject. It may be stated at the outset
that the basic principles of derivative settlement, having been trans-
ferred almost bodily from the law of acquired domicile, are rather
well-settled. Although these principles will be stated, the primary
task of this section is to determine whether these rules as applied to
general assistance problems have had socially desirable consequences.
In this connection, it is of interest to note the reasons for the de-
rivative settlement concept that have been advanced by some of the
American courts. Apart from adopting the legal fiction that women
and children are not sui juris,11 the courts have also pointed out that
the principle of derivative settlement is based on the desirability of
treating the family as a unit.64 Whether the courts have achieved this
goal is another matter. It should be remembered that if the members
of a family are split for general assistance purposes by the rules of
derivative settlement some of them will not be residents of the locality
to which the family applies.6 If their needs are not covered by the
grant of assistance that is made the entire family will suffer.
Even if the nonsettled status of some of the members of the family
is disregarded and assistance is granted, in most cases some other
locality will ultimately be liable for their support. Procedures are
often provided for the collection of relief costs from the place of
settlement and in such a case the cost and complexity of relief ad-
ministration will be increased if the rules of derivative settlement
60. 1:' & 14 CAR. 2, c. 12 (1662).
61. Inhabitants of St. Giles v. Inhabitants of Eversley Blackwater, 2 Ld. Raym.
1332, 92 Eng. Rep. 368 (K.B. 1732); Inhabitants of Cumner v. Inhabitants of
Milton, 2 Salk. 528, 91 Eng. Rep. 449 (K.B. 1703) ; Whitechapel Parish v. Stepney
Parish, Carth. 433, 90 Eng. Rep. 851 (K.B. 1689).
62. See, e.g., City of Willmar v. Village of Spicer, 129 Minn. 395, 152 N.W.
767 (1915); Wells v. Westhaven, 5 Vt. *322 (1833). However, it should be kept
in mind that the court may construe the absence of any provision in the general
assistance law regarding derivative settlements as an indication that this principle
was meant to be excluded. See Town of Fairfax v. Town of Westford, 67 Vt.
390, 31 Atl. 847 (1895).
63. See, e.g., Town of Colchester v. Town of Lyme, 13 Conn. *274 (1839);
Inhabitantg of Huntington v. Inhabitants of Oxford, 4 Day 189 (Conn. 1810).
64. Polk County v. Clarke County, 171 Iowa 558, 151 N.W. 489 (1915); Inhab-
itants of Waldoborough v. Inhabitants of Friendship, 87 le. 211, 32 AtI. 880
(1895); Jefferson Township v. Letart Township, 3 Ohio *99 (1827).
65. For reports of actual settlement entanglements of the type indicated, see
CONNECTICUT EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMISSION, REPORT, 76, 77 (1935); House Select
Committee, Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens, H.R. REP. No. 369, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 644 (1941).
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unnecessarily split the members of the family group1 The law of
derivative settlement, then, will be examined for its effect on the
family unit.
The Wife's Settlement
It is settled, even in the absence of a specific statutory provision,
that a wife takes the settlement of her husband if he has one, but
retains her own if he has none.67 This principle has been explicitly
enacted into the statutes of several jurisdictions."8 This rule seems
desirable since it tends to preserve the unity of husband and wife
for assistance purposes.
Difficulties are presented, however, in cases in which the husband
is dead or has deserted,69 or in which the parties have secured a di-
66. Some mention might also be made at this point of the compulsory removal
laws still found in many jurisdictions which authorize the removal of persons in
need of relief, or likely to become so, to their place of settlement. If the members
of a family have different settlements, the possibility exists that they might be
split up through compulsory removals. See the comments of the court in Inhab-
itants of Waldoborough v. Inhabitants of Friendship, 87 Me. 211, 32 Atl. 880(1895). However, the separation of members of a family does not seem to be
a real possibility in most cases. See, e.g., In re Rutland, 215 Minn. 361, 10 N.W.
2d 365 (1943).
67. lfl 7 Rutland, 215 Minn. 361, 10 N.W.2d 365 (1943); Bateman v. Mathes,
54 N.J.L. 536, 24 At. 444 (Sup. Ct. 1892); Town of Sherburne v. Town of Nor-
wich, 12 N.Y.C.L. Rep. (16 Johns R.) *186 (1819); Spencer Township v. Pleasant
Township, 17 Ohio St. *31 (1866); Buffaloe v. Whitedeer, 15 Pa. 182 (1850);
Wells v. Westhaven, 5 Vt. *322 (1833) ; King v. Inhabitants of Brington, 7 B. & C.
546, 108 Eng. Rep. 826 (K.B. 1827). There is a tendency in some of the American
decisions to refer to the rules laid down in the early English cases as the "common
law" of settlement. Cf. Inhabitants of Newtown v. Inhabitants of Stratford, 3
Conn. 600 (1821). The term is not accurate, of course, since settlement law is
wholly statutory. Its use can probably be explained by the antiquity of the cases
and the fact that they dealt with problems of interpretation that were not ex-
plicitly covered by the statute.
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2577 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, § 436-10 (c) (Supp.
1954); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-147 (a) (Burns 1951); IoWA CODE ANN. § 252.16 (4)(1949); ME. REV. STAT. c. 94, § 1(I) (1954); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 116, § I(See,
ond) (1949); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.168 (1950); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68.115(3)(Supp. 1953); N.H. REV. LAWS c. 123, § I(I) (1942) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-11(Supp. 1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-159(2) (1952); N.D. REv. CODE § 50-0201(Supp. 1953); OHIO REV. CODE § 5113.05 (Baldwin Supp. 1955); OILA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 56, § 40(Second) (1950); S.C. CODE § 71-152(1) (1952); S.D. CODE §
50.0102(1) (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-60(2) (1953); VT. REV. STAT. §
7099 (1947); Wis. STAT. § 49.10(1) (1953).
The Maine statute has a provision stating that the wife's settlement is not
changed if the marriage was collusively procured for the purpose of changing
her settlement. For cases applying the statute, see Inhabitants of Orrington v.
City of Bangor, 46 A.2d 406 (Me. 1946); Inhabitants of Hudson v. Inhabi-
tants of Charleston, 97 Me. 17, 53 Atl. 832 (1902). At least one court seemed
disinclined to adopt such a rule in the absence of a statutory provision. Town of
Concord v. Town of Goffstown, 2 N.H. 263 (1820). The validity of a marriage
may be attacked collaterally in a suit in which the settlement of the parties is at
issue. If the marriage is void the wife's settlement has not been changed. Johnson
v. Huntington, 1 Day 212 (Conn. 1804) ; Inhabitants of Middleborough v. Inhab-
itants of Rochester, 12 Mass. *363 (1815) - Farmington v. Somersworth, 44 N.H.
589 (1863); Town of Reading v. Town of Ludlow, 43 Vt. *628 (1871).
69. If the wife, widow, or divorcee has children dependent on her, she may, if in
need, qualify for the aid to dependent children program. Eligibility for this pro-
gram does not depend on the settlement or residence of the father. 49 STAT. 627
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss1/7
SETTLEMENT AND GENERAL ASSISTANCE
vorce. When the husband dies or when a divorce is obtained, it now
seems settled that the former settlement of the wife does not revive
if the husband had a settlement. Instead, the settlement which the
wife acquired through him continues until she has acquired a new
one in her own right.7 This rule works no hardship in the ordinary
case since the husband will probably have acquired a settlement in the
locality in which the couple actually resided.
However, the husband's settlement may be in a locality in which
he lived prior to his marriage and with which the wife is not familiar.
In that event, it may be preferable to allow the wife's settlement to
revive. Since, however, the wife may also have been absent from the
place of her settlement for a considerable period of time, she ought to
be given the option to elect or reject it. There is some statutory ac-
ceptance of this approach. 71 In this event, it may also be desirable to
facilitate the wife's acquisition of a settlement in the locality in
which she has in fact been living by authorizing her to add the time
spent prior to the divorce or death to the time spent in the locality
thereafter. Of course, this is presently not possible because of the
view that the wife is not sui juris for settlement purposes during the
marriage-' However, at least one statute has changed this rule7 3 and
perhaps this may lead to a possible change in judicial attitudes also.
If the wife has been deserted by her spouse, her position seems
particularly disadvantageous. The traditional rule in this situation is
that the wife may not acquire a new settlement since the marital rela-
tionship still subsists and the legal personality of the wife continues
to be merged with that of her husband.7- While there seems to be a
(1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1952). In general assistance cases the
courts seem to have had difficulty in dealing with situations involving the needs
of mothers and dependent children.
70. Inhabitants of Guilford v. Inhabitants of Oxford, 9 Conn. *321 (1832);
Inhabitants of Dalton v. Inhabitants of Bernardston, 9 Mass. *201 (1812); City of
Williamsport v. Eldred Township, 84 Pa. 429 (1877); Buffaloe v. Whitedeer, 15
Pa. 182 (1850); Town of Royalton v. Town of West-Fairlee, 11 Vt. *438 (1839).
An early New York case, Town of Sherburne v. Town of Norwich, 12 N.Y.C.L.
Rep. (11; Johns. R.) 18G (1819), which held to the contrary now seems to be dis-
credited. The majority American view was ultimately adopted by the English
courts. Reigate Union v. Croydon Union, 14 App. Cas. 465 (1889). The same rule
is applicable to acquired domiciles. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35 (3d ed.
1949).
71. See the Iowa and Utah statutes cited in note 68 supra. An election is per-
mitted if the wife's settlement is in the state. These statutes also apply to an
abandonment of the wife by the husband. The New Jersey and Vermont statutes,
note 68 supra, enact the rule that the wife's settlement does not revive upon the
dissolution of the marriage. If the wife's settlement could be analogized to a type
of intangible personal property, it could be contended that she retains "title" to it
during her marriage and regains control of it when the marriage is dissolved. See
PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 335 (3d ed. 1930).
72. Inhabitants of Thomaston v. Inhabitants of St. George, 17 Me. 117 (1840);
Town of Brookfield v. Town of Hartland, 10 Vt. *424 (1838).
78. 'See the Connecticut statute, note 68 supra.
74. Town of Howland v. Town of Burlington, 53 Me. 54 (1865); Inhabitants of
Augusta v. Inhabitants of Kingfield, 36 Me. 235 (1853); Rhatigan v. Jones, 271
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reluctance to follow this rule in other contexts in which domicile is
important,75 it has recently been affirmed in a settlement case. 0 The
rule seems unfortunate. In many cases the wife who is abandoned
or deserted chooses to take up a new residence elsewhere. To deny
her a settlement in the place where she desires to live does not seem
fair to her and may have the effect of making her dependent on a
locality to which she may have become a total stranger. Several settle-
ment statutes now allow a married woman who has been abandoned
and deserted to acquire a settlement in her own right.77
By way of compensation it may be noted that the legally dependent
position of the wife often helps her to retain her derivative settlement.
Under a statute providing that a settlement is lost after a prescribed
App. Div. 328, 65 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1st Dep't 1946); Town of Van Buren v. City of
Syracuse, 72 Misc. 463, 131 N.Y. Supp. 345 (County Ct. 1911) City of Syracuse
v. County of Onondaga, 25 Misc. 371, 55 N.Y. Supp. 634 (County Ct. 1898);
Spencer Township v. Pleasant Township, 17 Ohio St. *31 (1866) ; Delaware Town-
ship v. Zerbe Township, 3 Pa. County Ct. 643 (Q.S. 1886) ; Town of Fox Lake v.
Town of Trenton, 244 Wis. 412, 12 N.W.2d 679 (1944); Ashland County v. Bay-
field County, 244 Wis. 210, 12 N.W.2d 34 (1943); Monroe County v. Jackson
County, 72 Wis. 449, 40 N.W. 224 (1888) ; of. Town of Windham v. Town of Nor-
wich, 1 Root 408 (Conn. 1792); Town of Mount Holly v. Town of Peru, 72 Vt. 68,
47 At. 103 (1899) (wife cannot acquire new settlement when parties separated,
apparently without fault of either party).
75. The first exception was to allow the wife to acquire a separate domicile for
purposes of securing a divorce. This rule has now been extended to other situa-
tions. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914) (suit for damages for aliena-
tion of affections); 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 28.2-40.4 (1935) ; GOODRICH, op.
cit. supra note 70, § 36.
76. Ashland County v. Bayfield County, 244 Wis. 210, 12 N.W.2d 34 (1943).
But of. Bradford v. City of Worcester, 184 Mass. 557, 69 N.E. 310 (1904).
77. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, § 436-10(c) (Supp. 1954) (if the parties are living
"separate and apart"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.16(4) (1949) (if the wife "lives
apart" or is "abandoned"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.07(3) (Supp. 1954) (wife
"abandoned or deserted"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-115(3) (Supp. 1953) (same);
N.D. REv. CODE § 50-0201 (Supp. 1953) (after uninterrupted separation without
divorce for one year); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-60(2) (1953) (same as Iowa);
VT. REv. STAT. § 7099 (1947) (if divorced or legally separated, or if husband has
deserted her for three years). The Indiana statute gives the wife a settlement in
the township in which she was living at the time of abandonment if she had re-
sided there for a prescribed period. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-147(a) (Burns 1951).
The Minnesota statute does not contain the rule allotting the wife the settlement
of her husband, but does contain a provision authorizing her to acquire a settle-
ment in her own right if she is abandoned. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.07 (3) (Supp.
1954).
For a case applying the Iowa statute, see Washington County v. Polk County,
137 Iowa 333, 113 N.W. 833 (1907). The Minnesota court has held that if the
wife abandons her husband she is not entitled to the benefit of the statute. In ro
Baalson, 211 Minn. 96, 300 N.W. 204 (1941). Some of the other statutes seem
broad enough to include this contingency and some courts have reached a conclu-
sion contrary to that of the Minnesota court in passing on questions of domicile in
other contexts. GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 70, § 36. It is hard to see why the
method by which a settlement is acquired is any more important than the reason
which prompts the need for general assistance.
Two statutes seem to allow a married woman to acquire a new domicile. MASS,
ANN. LAws c. 116, § 1 (Second) (1949) (only if husband has no settlement); N.H.
REV. LAWS c. 123, § 1 (11) (1942). Under the New Jersey law the wife loses her
settlement after separation from her husband and absence from the state for one
year. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-11(c) (Supp. 1954).
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period of absence from the locality, it has been held that the absence
of the wife while residing with her husband during his lifetime is not
a voluntary absence and therefore does not count as a statutory ab-
sence.', However, the same court also held that the wife's derivative
settlement is not lost if her husband loses his settlement while he is
residing apart from her." Though the latter result seems commend-
able as it recognizes the independent status of the married woman,
it does not seem consistent with the view that the wife's legal person-
ality is merged with that of her husband. The result of this case was
changed by statute. M'
A more equitable solution to the problems presented by the marriage
situation could be achieved if the courts would attribute the husband's
settlement to the wife only if they are in fact living together as man
and wife. Once the parties have separated permanently, whether di-
vorced or not, it would seem that each party should retain the marital
settlement but should be permitted to lose or acquire a settlement
thereafter in his or her own right. In this event it would be possible
to award the wife a settlement in her real home if her residence prior
to the separation were attributed to her.
Furthermore, the object of treating the family as a unit would be
better served if the husband were allowed to take the wife's settlement
if he had none at the time of the marriage. Under the present rule the
wife retains her settlement and so the family is split for assistance
purposes." This approach, then, would consider the family as a unit
while the husband and wife are living together, but would give the
wife an equal status in the relationship and would free her from the
disabilities of marriage once the family home has been broken up.
78. Town of Cohasset v. Town of Norwell, 276 Mass. 100, 176 N.E. 924 (1931);
Inhabitants of Brookfield v. Inhabitants of Holden, 247 Mass. 577, 142 N.E. 784(1924). But cf. City of Somerville v. Massachusetts, 313 Mass. 482, 48 N.E.2d 8(1943). In the Somerville case a widow who had acquired a derivative settlement
through her first husband married a second time. The court held that because the
second marriage was her own voluntary act, her derivative settlement was lost by
her absence in the company of her second husband for the required statutory
period.
79. Treasurer & Receiver General v. Boston, 255 Mass. 499, 152 N.E. 37(1926); Treasurer & Receiver General v. Boston, 229 Mass. 83, 118 N.E. 284(1918). It should be noted that this rule has the effect of preserving to the wife
who has been abandoned or deserted the settlement that she acquired through her
husband. This is of some importance in view of the traditional rule that a wife
who is abandoned or deserted cannot acquire a new settlement in her own right.
80. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 116, § 5 (1949). For a similar statute, see ME. REV.STAT. c. 94, § 3 (1954), applied in City of Portland v. City of Auburn, 96 Me. 501,
52 Atl, 1011 (1902). See also note 100 infra.
81. Another example will illustrate the effect of the suggested change. If the
wife were in the process of acquiring a settlement at the time of the marriage and
the couple continued to reside in the wife's comnunity, the wife would acquire a
settlement upon the completion of the statutory period of residence and this would
immediately be transmitted to her husband.
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Settlement of the Children
The same reasons8 2 that have brought about the rule that the wife
acquires the settlement of her husband have resulted in similar rules
with reference to legitimate niinor children. In the absence of an
express statutory provision, while the child's place of birth is prima
facie his place of settlement, he will take his father's place of settle-
ment if he has one and, if not, the place of settlement of his mother."
Mlany jurisdictions have statutes which codify this rule.84
82. See Jefferson Township v. Letart Township, 3 Ohio 100 (1827). The court
points out that it has adopted these rules of derivative settlement of the legitimate
minor children because they are not sui juris and because of a desire to pre-
serve the unity of the family.
83. Town of Washington v. Town of Warren, 123 Conn. 268, 193 Atl. 751(1937) ; Town of Windham v. Town of Lebanon, 51 Conn. 319 (1883) ; Inhabitants
of Sterling v. Inhabitants of Plainfield, 4 Conn. 114 (1821); Inhabitants of New-
town v. Inhabitants of Stratford, 3 Conn. 600 (1821) ; Town of Hebron v. Town of
Colchester, 5 Day 169 (Conn. 1811); Inhabitants of Freetown v. Inhabitants of
Taunton, 16 Mass. 52 (1819); Miller v. Banner County, 127 Neb. 690 256 N.W.
639 (1934); Township of Little Falls v. Township of Bernards, 44 W.J.L. 621(Sup. Ct. 1882); Township of Madison v. Township of Monroe, 42 N.J.L. 493(Sup. Ct. 1880); Town of Bern v. Town of Knox, 18 N.Y.C.L. Rep. (6 Cow.) *433(1826); Town of Vernon v. Town of Smithville, 13 N.Y.C.L. Rep. (17 Johns. R.)
*90 (1819); Jefferson Township v. Letart Township, 3 Ohio 100 (1827); Wayne
Township v. Porter Township, 138 Pa. 181, 20 At. 939 (1890) ; Exeter v. Warwick,
1 R.I. 63 (1834) ; Town of Bethel v. Town of Tunbridge, 13 Vt. *445 (1841). This
rule is consistent with the rule that the wife retains her settlement if the husband
has none. In this event, the wife's settlement is transmitted to the child.
One court has held that a child born in another country of American parents
does not acquire a settlement by derivation. Town of Elmore v. Town of Calais,
33 Vt. *468 (1860). The decision does not seem correct in view of the fact that
persons born abroad of American citizens are also citizens of this country. For a
decision holding to the contrary, see Inhabitants of Oldtown v. Inhabitants of
Bangor, 58 Me. 353 (1870). However, no problem has been presented by children
born in other states. Town of New Hartford v. Town of Canaan, 54 Conn. 39,
5 Atl. 360 (1886); Town of Westford v. Town of Essex, 31 Vt. *459 (1859). See
also N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 117(2).
84. ALA. CODE tit. 44, § 5 (1940); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2577 (1949); ILL. ANN.
STAT. c. 23, § 436-10(d) (Supp. 1954); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1471b) (Burns
1951); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.16(5) (1949); ME. REv. STAT. C. 94, § 1(II)
(1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 116, § 1 (Third) (1949); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.168(1950) (individual's settlement communicated to members of his "family");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.07(3) (West Supp. 1954) (minor has settlement with
person with whom he resides); MIss. CODE ANN. § 7354 (1952) ; NEB. REV. STAT.§ 68-115(3) (Supp. 1953) (minor has settlement with parent with whom he re-
sides); N.H. REV. LAWS c. 123, § 1(111) (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-12(Supp. 1954); N.Y. SOcIAL WELFARE LAW § 117(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-
159(3) (1952); N.D. REV. CODE § 50-0203 (1943); OHIO REv. CODE § 5113.05(1955); OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 40(Third) (1950); S.C. CODE § 71-152(2)(Supp. 1952); S.D. CODE § 50.0102(2) (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-60(3)(1953); VT. REV. STAT. § 7100 (1947); Wis. STAT. § 49.10(2) (1953); of. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2509 (Supp. 1954) (a child less than one year of age derives
a settlement from his parent or from the relatives "with whom he is living").
For a case holding that the settlement of the child continues to be that of the
father even after the divorce court has awarded legal custody to the mother, see
Town of Marlborough v. Town of Hebron, 2 Conn. 20 (1816). Contra, Summit
County v. Trumbull County, 116 Ohio St. 663, 158 N.E. 172 (1927), on the ground
that the mother had legal custody. The view of the latter case seems preferred
since it bases derivative settlement on the actual family unit. Statutes in several
states now provide that the settlement of the child is derived from the parent who
has been given custody. N.H. REV. LAWS c. 123, § I (XII) (1942), and the Maine,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin statutes cited above.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss1/7
SETTLEMENT AND GENERAL ASSISTANCE
Beyond the natural relationship of parent and child, however, it
might be expected that the courts would face difficulties in applying
the concept of derivative settlement€: While adopted children have
been held to be entitled to a settlement derived from their parents by
adoption,- illegitimate children have not fared so well. Except in
Connecticut, 7 which early held that the settlement of an illegitimate
child follows that of his mother, most courts have held that in the
absence of a statutory provision to the contrary the illegitimate has a
settlement at the place of his birth. This rule is the consequence of
the theory that the illegitimate is "nobody's child." Therefore, he
acquires nobody's settlement. It is apparent that this rule might
operate quite harshly on the illegitimate. Since the settlement of the
mother may be some place other than the place where the child was
born, the mother and child living together will be split for relief pur-
poses. Fortunately, several states have altered this rule by an explicit
statutory amendment which gives to such a child the settlement of his
mother if she has one.-$
A few statutes provide that a child does not have a settlement in the place in
which he was born unless his parents had a settlement there. N.D. REv. CODE §
50-0203 (11943); S.D. CODE § 50.0102(3) (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-60(5)(1953).
85. Similar problems have arisen under the family responsibility provisions ofgeneral assistance laws. For example, because of lack of legal status at common
law most courts have held that illegitimate children are not entitled to the benefits
of these statutes. See, e.g., Town of Plymouth v. Hey, 285 Mass. 357, 189 N.E.
100 (1934).86. Inhabitants of Waldoborough v. Inhabitants of Friendship, 87 Me. 211, 32
Atl. 880 (1895); Washburn v. White, 140 Mass. 568, 5 N.E. 813 (1886). For
statutes codifying this rule, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 40(Sixth) (1950);
VT. REV . STAT. § 7103(111) (1947).
87. Town of Plainville v. Town of Milford, 119 Conn. 380, 177 AtI. 138 (1935);
Town of Windham v. Town of Lebanon, 51 Conn. 319 (1883). The Connecticut
court has had difficulty determining the settlement of an illegitimate who is born
in a state having a different rule than that of Connecticut. Compare Inhabitants
of Woodstock v. Hooker, 6 Conn. 35 (1825), with Town of Bethlem v. Town of
Roxbury, 20 Conn. 297 (1850).
88. Inhabitants of Blackstone v. Inhabitants of Seekonk, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 75(1851) (dictum); South Hampton v. Hampton Falls, 11 N.H. 134 (1840); Dela-
vergne v. Noxon, 11 N.Y.C.L. Rep. (14 Johns. R.) *334 (1817); State ex rel.
Men itt v. McQuaig, 63 N.C. 550 (1869). One court has held that this rule will
apply if the parents' marriage was void, on the ground that this makes the chil-
dren technically illegitimate. Wayne Township v. Porter Township, 138 Pa. 181,
20 Atl. 931.9 (1890). To an argument that it should hold to the contrary for senti-
mental i easons, the court replied, "But I know of nothing so free from sentiment
as the toor laws of this state." 138 Pa. at 183, 20 AtI. at 940. The rule stated in
the text does not apply if there was any collusion to secure the birth of the child
in any particular place.
If by the marriage of his natural parents the child is legitimated, then the
rules regaiding the settlements of legitimate children apply to him. Town of
Simsbury v. Town of Hartford, 69 Conn. 302, 37 Atl. 678 (1897); Inhabitants
of Wellington v. Inhabitants of Corinna, 104 Me. 252, 71 At. 889 (1908); Town
of Rockingham v. Town of Mount Holly, 26 Vt. *653 (1854). See ME. REv. STAT.
c. 94, § 1(111) (1954).
89. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-147(c) (Burns 1951); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.16(6)(1949); ME;. REV. STAT. c. 94, § 1(111) (1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 116, § 1(Fourth) (1949); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 123, § I(IV) (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
However, the chances of family-splitting as a consequence of the
principles of derivative settlement seem greatest in the case in which
a widow with legitimate minor children remarries. This poses the
problem of the stepfather's relationship to his family. At common
law the stepfather is not liable for the support of his minor stepchild.90
As a consequence, a legitimate child who has the settlement of his
mother, though he takes by derivation a settlement which his mother
may subsequently acquire in her own right,9 l does not take the settle-
ment which she acquires by derivation upon her remarriage.0 2
This rule has now been changed by statutory provisions in a few
jurisdictions,93 and it would seem that it has also been altered by the
typical provision of many settlement laws that a child takes the settle-
ment of his mother if his father has none. Under a statute of this type
there is authority that the provision applies to a new settlement which
the child's mother acquires by derivation. 4 However, this type of
statute provides only a partial solution to this problem. If the father
has a settlement in the state it will be acquired by the child, and since
it will be retained on the father's death it will not be affected by the
44:8A-13 (Supp. 1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-159(4) (1952); N.D. REv. CODE §
50-0203(2) (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 40(Fourth) (1950); S.C. CODE
§ 71-152(3) (1952); S.D. CODE § 50.0102(3) (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-
60(4) (1953) ; VT. REV. STAT. § 7102 (1947).
Conceivably, a statute providing simply that a "minor" shall take the settle-
ment of his parents could apply to an illegitimate child also. This is the viewpoint
of the Minnesota court. County of Stearns v. Township of Fair Haven, 203 Minn.
11, 279 N.W. 707 (1938).
90. See PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 247 (3d ed. 1930). This seems to be as-
sumed in cases arising under the family responsibility laws. Cf. Bradley v. Zim-
merman, 13 N.J. Misc. 580, 180 Atl. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
91. See, e.g., Inhabitants of Dedham v. Inhabitants of Natick, 16 Mass. *135
(1819); Burrell Township v. Pittsburg, 62 Pa. 472 (1869).
92. The rule applies whether the child has, at the time of his mother's remar-
riage, his mother's settlement or that of his deceased father. Town of Oxford v.
Town of Bethany, 19 Conn. *229 (1848); Inhabitants of Freetown v. Inhabitants
of Taunton, 16 Mass. *52 (1819); Spencer Township v. Pleasant Township, 17
Ohio St. *31 (1866); Trustees of Bloomfield v. Trustees of Chagrin, 5 Ohio *315(1832); Borough of Northumberland v. Borough of Milton, 9 At. 449 (Pa. 1887);
Wells v. Westhaven, 5 Vt. *322 (1833). On the authority of Rex v. Munden, i
Str. 190, 93 Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1719), the English courts ultimately held that at
common law a stepfather was not responsible for the support of his minor step-
child. Tubb v. Harrison, 4 T.R. 118, 100 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1790). Much earlier,
however, the conclusion had been reached on somewhat similar grounds that the
stepchild did not take the settlement of his stepfather on his mother's remarriage.
Parish of St. George v. Parish of St. Katharine, Sess. Cas. 22, 93 Eng. Rep. 22
(K.B. 1714).
93. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-15 (Supp. 1954) (implies that minor child
takes settlement of mother on her remarriage if in her custody); VT. REV. STAT.
§ 7099 (1947) (explicit provision).
94. Inhabitants of Great Barrington v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 35 Mass. (18
Pick.) 264 (1836); Inhabitants of Plymouth v. Inhabitants of Freetown, 18 Mass.
197 (1822); Hopkinton v. Warner, 53 N.H. 468 (1873); of. City of Willmar v.
Village of Spicer, 129 Minn. 395, 152 N.W. 767 (1915). The Maine statute has
now been amended to prevent the child from acquiring the settlement of his step-
father. See City of Augusta v. Town of Mexico, 141 Me. 48, 38 A.2d 822 (1944).
This is also the effect of the present New Hampshire law. N.H. REv. LAWs c. 123,
§ I(XI) (1942).
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mother's remarriage.2 Some statutes have corrected this situation by
awarding the child the settlement of the mother upon the death of the
father.6
Since, in the absence of an explicit statutory provision to the con-
trary, an illegitimate child does not derive a settlement through his
mother, her remarriage would not affect his settlement. In Connecti-
cut, where the illegitimate child takes the settlement of his mother, the
court has held that it changes with her remarriage.9 7 In other juris-
dictions, statutes awarding the illegitimate child the settlement of his
mother have been variously construed as limited to the settlement
which his mother had upon his birth, 5 or as extended to any settle-
ment which she acquires by derivation.2
As in the case of married women, the legally dependent status of
the minor child is both an aid and a hindrance to his acquisition and
retention of a settlement. While an absence during minority will not
result in a loss of his derivative settlement,100 neither may the minor
add his residence in a locality prior to attaining his majority to a
residence subsequent to that date in order to meet the statutory re-
qu i rement for a settlement by residence. 10
95. Inhabitants of Walpole v. Inhabitants of Marblehead, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.)
528 (1851). See also City of Rockland v. Inhabitants of Lincolnville, 135 Me. 420,
198 Atl. 744 (1938) ; ef. Town of Newark v. Town of Sutton, 40 Vt. "261 (1867)
(if father had no settlement, child takes settlement of mother when father dies).
96. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 116, § 1(Third) (1949) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-12
(Supp. 1954); OHIO REV. CODE § 5113.05 (Supp. 1955); VT. REV. STAT. § 7101(1947); Wis. STAT. § 49.10(2) (1953). The Massachusetts statute would appear
to change the result in the WaFpole and Rockland cases, supra note 95.
97. New Haven v. Town of Newtown, 12 Conn. 164 (1837). However, Connecti-
cut follows the usual rule with regard to legitimate children. See the cases cited
in note 92 N-upra.
98, Inhabitants of Boylston v. Inhabitants of Princeton, 13 Mass. *381 (1816)(under prior law); Town of Dorchester v. Town of Deerfield, 3 N.H. 316 (1825);
Town of Morristown v. Town of Fairfield, 46 Vt. *33 (1873) ; Town of Burlington
v. Town of Essex, 19 Vt. 91 (1846). Some of these cases appear to rely on a pro-
vision in the statute that an illegitimate child is to have the settlement of his
mother at the time of his birth. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 116, § 1(Fourth) (1952)
provides that, "illegitimate children shall follow and have the settlement of their
mother." Cf. Inhabitants of Petersham v. Inhabitants of Dana, 12 Mass. 428
(1815).
99. City of Augusta v. Town of Mexico, 141 Me. 48, 38 A.2d 822 (1944) (noting
a change in the Maine law which the court reasoned was intended to accomplish
this result). Cf. Overseers of the Poor of Canajoharie v. Overseers of the Poor of
Johnson, 13. N.Y.C.L. Rep. (17 Johns. R.) *41 (1819) (under prior law).
100. Treasurer & Receiver General v. Boston, 255 Mass. 499, 152 N.E. 37(1924). Maine has a statute which provides that an individual's loss of settle-
ment will result in the loss of any settlements derived from him. ME. REV. STAT. C.
82, § 3 (1944). This clause does not apply to persons not dependent on the in-
dividual at the time his settlement is lost, e.g., to minors who previously have been
emancipated. Town of Winslow v. City of Old Town, 134 Me. 73, 181 Atl. 816(1935); City of Bangor v. Inhabitants of Veazie, 111 Me. 371, 89 At. 193 (1914).
For a similar provision, see MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 116, § 5 (1952). See also VT.
REv. STAT. § 7104 (1947) (derivative settlement lost three years after minor
comes of age).
101. Town of Poultney v. Town of Glover, 23 Vt. *328 (1851). While the case
involved residence prior to the time the minor achieved his majority, the reasoning
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Difficulties such as those just described can be obviated by the
adoption of statutes, already existing in some jurisdictions,10 2 which
award the children the settlement of the parent with whom they in
fact reside. If it is .made clear that the statute applies to all of the
members of the family group, whether adopted or illegitimate chil-
dren, or the wife's children by a prior marriage, then the derivative
settlement principle will preserve rather than split the unity of the
family.
The need for a statutory change such as this is well-illustrated by
the rules regarding emancipated children. The courts have uniformly
held that an emancipated child takes the settlement of his parent, if
any, at the time of his emancipation and does not take any settlement
which the parent might acquire subsequent to this time.103 As in
other contexts involving the parent-child relationship, emancipation
for settlement purposes may occur by means of the consent of the
parent or by operation of law.10 4 Of course, children are considered
of the decision would seem applicable to a residence prior to the date of a minor's
emancipation in a state where an emancipated minor may acquire a settlement in
his own right. See notes 106-07 inf'a.
102. See the statutes in Michigan, Minnesota, and Nebraska in note 84 supra.
If the child resides apart from his parents, he should be given the settlement Qf
the person with whom he lives. Of course, if the family is living together as a
unit and the father has a settlement, this should control the settlement of the
other members of the family.
103. Town of Torrington v. Town of Norwich, 21 Conn. *543 (1852); Trenton
v. Brewer, 134 Me. 295, 186 Atl. 612 (1936) ; Town of Liberty v. Town of Levant
122 Me. 300, 119 Atl. 811 (1923); Inhabitants of Hampden v. Inhabitants o?
Brewer, 24 Me. 281 (1844); Inhabitants of Shirley v. Inhabitants of Lancaster, 88
Mass. (6 Allen) 31 (1863); Fremont v. Sandown, 56 N.H. 300 (1876) ; Salisbury
v. Orange, 5 N.H. 348 (1831); Town of Niskayuna v. City of Albany, 16 N.Y.C.L.
Rep. (2 Cow.) 537 (1824); Loyalsock Township Overseers v. Eldred Township
Overseers, 154 Pa. 358, 26 Atl. 313 (1893); Town of Tunbridge v. Town of Eden,
39 Vt. *17 (1866).
The rule of the Maine cases appears to have been changed by ME. REV. STAT.
e. 94, § 1(11) (1944) (child takes derivative settlement of father until child comes
of age). See also MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.168 (1950) (derivative settlement not
lost until person acquires new settlement in own right); MINN. STAT. ANN §
261.07(3) (West Supp. 1954) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-115(3) (Supp. 1953)(same); N.D. REv. CODE § 50-0204(3) (Supp. 1953) (same). The New Hamp-
shire law appears to have codified the rule of the cases. N.H. Rv. LAws c. 123, §
1(X) (1942).
104. HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAmILY 499 (1952). For typical general as-
sistance cases considering the question of emancipation for settlement purposes,
see Town of Torrington v. Town of Norwich, 21 Conn. *543 (1852); Town of
Bozrah v. Town of Stonington, 4 Conn. 373 (1822); Inhabitants of Trenton v.
City of Brewer, 134 Me. 295, 186 Atl. 612 (1936); City of Bangor v. Inhabitants
of Veazie, 111 Me. 371, 89 Atl. 193 (1914) ; Inhabitants of Thomaston v. Inhabi-
tants of Greenbush, 106 Me. 242, 76 At. 690 (1909); Inhabitants of Liberty v.
Inhabitants of Palermo, 79 Me. 473, 10 Atl. 455 (1887); Inhabitants of Portland
v. Inhabitants of New-Gloucester, 16 Me. 427 (1840); Inhabitants of Sumner v.
Inhabitants.of Sebec, 3 Me. *223 (1824); Inhabitants of Taunton v. Inhabitants
of Plymouth, 15 Mass. *203 (1818) ; Adams v. Foster, 14 N.Y.C.L. Rep. (20 Johns.
R.) *452 (1823); Overseers of the Poor of Toby Township v. Overseers of the
Poor of Madison, 44 Pa. 60 (1862) ; Highland Township Poor District v. Jefferson
County Poor District, 25 Pa. Super. 601 (1904).
'The New Hampshire and Vermont settlement laws contain a definition of
emancipation. N.H. REv. LAws c. 123, § 1(XI) (1942); VT. REV. STAT. § 7097
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legally emancipated when they reach twenty-one years of age. Only
the child over twenty-one who is compelled to continue in his parents'
home because he is incapacitated or for any reason incapable of caring
for himself is considered to be unemancipated. 05
Difficulties arise in connection with emancipated children who
either continue to reside with their families or return to their families
after a period of absence. Especially in the latter instance, if the child
no longer takes the settlement of his parent or parents, the family
may be split if the head of the family has acquired a new settlement in
the meantime. The effects of this rule may be avoided in the case of
children of age who voluntarily continue to reside in their parents'
home because such children may acquire a settlement by residence in
their own right at the same time that their parents acquire a settle-
ment in the same locality. Whether minor children who are emanci-
pated may acquire a settlement in their own right is not clear.
In the absence of an explicit statutory provision it has been held
that emancipated minors may acquire a settlement by residence, 0 6 and
some statutes so provide.'1 On the other hand, there are statutes ex-
(1947 ). The Vermont statute, which appears declaratory of the case law, pro-
vides: "Emancipated: a minor arriving at the age of majority, the marriage of
such minor or the contracting of a relation inconsistent with the relation of parent
and child bv which thereby the parent loses all authority over the minor including
the riight to his services."
105 Inhabitants of Winterport v. Inhabitants of Newburgh, 78 M11e. 136, 3 Atl.
48 (1886); Inhabitants of Monroe v. Inhabitants of Jackson, 55 Me. 55 (1867);
Town of Orford v. Town of Rumney, 3 N.H. 331 (1825); Overseers of the Poor of
Alexandria v. Overseers of the Poor of Bethlehem, 16 N.J.L. 119 (Sup. Ct. 1837);
Overseers of Washington v. Overseers of Beaver, 59 Pa. Sup. Ct. Rep. (3 W. & S.)
548 (1842); Town of Topsham v. Town of Chelsea, 60 Vt. 219, 13 Atl. 861 (1887).
It has been held that the exception does not apply if the disability occurs after
the child has reached his majority. Inhabitants of Buckland v. Inhabitants of
Charlemnt, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) *173 (1825) ; Loyalsock Township Overseers v.
Eldred Township Overseers, 154 Pa. 358, 26 AtI. 313 (1893). These holdings
ignore the reason for the rule, which is to prevent the separation of a family in
which one of its members depends on the others for support. The rule that an
incapacitated child who resides away from his parent does not take his settlement
by derivation may be justified. Inhabitants of Harrison v. Portland, 86 Me. 307,
29 Atl. 1084 (1894).
There seems to be little support in the American cases for the English view
that a child of age is not emancipated if he continues to reside in his parents'
home. For an expression of the English view, see The King v. Inhabitants of
Roach, 6 T.R. *247, 101 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1795). For a case typifying the
American view, see Inhabitants of Shirley v. Inhabitants of Lancaster, 88 Mass.(6 Allen) 31 (1863). In a few instances the English view has been adopted by
way of dictum. Overseers of the Poor of Alexandria v. Overseers of the Poor of
Bethlehem, 16 N.J.L. 119 (Sup. Ct. 1837) ; Overseers of Washington v. Overseers
of Beaver, 59 Pa. Sup. Ct. Rep. (3 W. & S.) 548 (1842). Both cases, however, in-
volved mentally incapacitated individuals.
106. Town of Milford v. Town of Greenwich, 126 Conn. 340, 11 A.2d 352 (1940);
Town of Plainville v. Town of Milford, 119 Conn. 380, 177 Atl. 138 (1935); In-
habitants of Township of Marlborough v. Inhabitants of Freehold, 50 N.J.L. 509,
14 Atl. 595 (Sup. Ct. 1888) (under prior law); cf. Overseers of Washington v.
Overseers of Beaver, 59 Pa. Sup. Ct. Rep. (3 W. & S.) 548 (1842). See Annot., 5
A.L.R. 958 (1920).
107. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, § 436-10(e), (f) (Supp. 1954); IND. ANN. STAT. §
52-147(h) (Burns 1951); Mica. STAT. ANN. § 16.168 (1950); N.H. REV. LAWS c.
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plicitly to the contrary.108 Some statutes, furthermore, restrict the
acquisition of a settlement by residence to persons "of full age" and
the courts have held that these statutes cannot be extended to minors
"of age" by virtue of their emancipation.10 A better solution to these
problems might be achieved by extending the suggested rule that the
child take the settlement of the parent with whom he resides to an
emancipated child also. Even though the child is emancipated, if he is
still part of the family group his settlement should be treated accord-
ingly.
CONCLUSION
A textual statement, point by point, of the elements of settlement
law, tends to oversimplify the issues that are presented in the typical
settlement case. Determining an individual's settlement may well in-
volve a decision regarding an original derivative settlement, perhaps
changed by the acquisition of another derivative settlement, which in
turn may have been changed by the acquisition of a settlement by
residence. Judicial inquiry is further complicated by the fact that a
derivative settlement, if it is not lost, may be passed forward from
generation to generation much like an inheritance of real estate.110
Not only is settlement law complex but, in this country, it has
largely been made by the courts in the New England and Middle
Atlantic states."" This phenomenon may be attributed to the fact that
these states were settled first and, therefore, were more subject to the
English influence. This is particularly true of New England. In these
jurisdictions the bar appears to have inherited the English tradition
123, § I(X) (1942) (in certain cases); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8A-14 (Supp. 1953) ;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.05 (Supp. 1955); VT. REV. STAT. § 7103 (1947); Wis.
STAT. § 49.10(6) (1953) (upon marriage). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.07(3)
(West Supp. 1954); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-115(3) (Supp. 1953); N.D. REV. CODE
§ 50-0204(3) (1943), all of which imply that an emancipated minor may acquire
a settlement in his own right. Some statutes authorize any minor who has no
settlement to acquire one in his own right. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-147(e) (Burns
1951); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 40(Fifth) (1950); S.D. CODE § 50.0102(5)
(1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-60(6) (1953).
108. MASS. ANN. LAws c. 116, § 1(First) (1949); S.C. CODE § 71-152(4)
(1952). See also the statutes in note 107 supra which authorize minors, whether
emancipated or not, to acquire a settlement.
109. County of Clay v. County of Palo Alto, 82 Iowa 626, 48 N.W. 1053 (1891)
(under prior law); Inhabitants of Thomaston v. Inhabitants of Greenbush, 106
Me. 242, 76 Atl. 690 (1909); Town of Hartford v. Town of Hartland, 19 Vt. *392(1847) (under prior law); Town of Grand Chute v. Milwaukee County, 230 Wis.
213, 282 N.W. 127 (1938) (under prior law). But cf. Inhabitants of Lowell v.
Inhabitants of Newport, 66 Me. 78 (1876) (under earlier form of the statute).
110. In Town of Marlborough v. Town of Hebron, 2 Conn. 20, 22 (1816) the
court said, "A settlement by parentage, is, in most respects, analogous to an in-
terest acquired by inheritance. .. ."
111. The only other jurisdictions in which there has been a fair amount of
settlement litigation at the appellate level are Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
the Dakotas.
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of litigating settlement questions ad infinitum, 112 and the decisions
bear the imprint of English settlement doctrine.
The consequences of the English influence should not be overlooked.
Because of the normal influence of the doctrine of stare decisis and
perhaps because settlement cases are so very complex, courts in other
states tend to follow the lead of the eastern cases. For this reason, a
contemporary settlement opinion reads very much like a settlement
opinion of 1795.111
In this connection, it may be noted that interesting problems of
interpretation are presented by statutes like those in New York and
Pennsylvania. These states, while not abandoning the concept of
settlement, have simplified the statute by requiring a state residence
only, and by abandoning earlier statutes containing very detailed pro-
visions." 1 Just how the courts will deal with such statutes has not
yet been made clear, though it would seem that the many problems of
acquired and derivative settlements cannot be entirely eliminated
simply by ignoring them.
If the settlement requirement is retained, it would seem preferable
to ameliorate the harsh effects of the settlement laws through statutory
changes specifically directed to the undesirable features of the present
system. The first point to be made is that settlement should not affect
the receipt of relief; assistance ought to be given to everybody with-
out discrimination. The settlement laws would then serve, as is now
the case in some jurisdictions, solely to allocate the cost of the relief
that has been given. Such an approach, it should be noted, will re-
quire a change in attitude on the administrative as well as the legis-
lative level.
112. See the conmment of Lord Mansfield in The King v. Inhabitants of Harber-
ton, 1 T.R. 1:39, 99 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1018 (K.B. 1786), who termed the poor law
litigation a "disgrace to the country." The considerable amount of settlement
litigation in New England may result from the fact that general relief in those
states wa: from the first the -esponsibility of small, local units of government.
The meagre resources of the typical New England town may have led to the belief
that relief costs could ultimately be reduced by litigating all doubtful points. See
RAUT', INTERGOVERNMIENTAL RELATIONS IN SOCIAL WELFARE 184, 191-92 (1952)(similar experience in Minnesota).
113. It should also be noted that the present nature of the settlement statutes
in the New England states facilitates the continuation of ancient concepts in this
area With the exception of Rhode Island, these states now have statutes regulat-
ing the law of settlement in detail. In other jurisdictions where such detailed
statutory prescriptions do not exist, courts and administrators must turn to very
early decisions by the New England courts which date from a time when the
settlement statutes of these states were also very brief. The alternative is to rely
on equally ancient cases decided under the comparable early form of the English
law
114. N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW §§ 62, 117; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2509
(Su pp. 1954). However, the Pennsylvania statutes applicable to county institu-
tion districts, which have the ultimate responsibility for persons not eligible under
the state-supervised general assistance program, still contain detailed provisions
applicable to settlement. See Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in General
Assistance, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 355, 367 n.49.
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Furthermore, a statute would seem to meet the objectives stated in
this article if it would predicate the acquisition of a settlement on resi-
dence alone without reference to the intent or living habits of the
individual and without any qualifications based on incapacity. The
difficulties involved in determining a settlement would be further ob-
viated if a settlement were necessary only on the state level. A return
to the concept that a settlement is not lost until another is obtained
would help prevent situations in which an applicant for relief has no
settlement in any locality. Finally, if the settlement of the father, or
of the mother if the child has no father, were attributed to all of the
other members of the family unit, the potentialities of the principles
of derivative settlement for family-splitting would be removed.
Settlement laws, in spite of predictions to the contrary,11 show no
signs of disappearing in the general assistance program. This article
might well end with an accounting of the human consequences of this
system. It has been pointed out that large scale internal migration
has become a permanent feature of the American social scene and
that individuals generally migrate, not to secure better treatment as
public assistance recipients, but to seek better economic opportunities.
This article has indicated, however, that migrants are particularly
disadvantaged in qualifying for general assistance because of the
difficulties they face in attempting to acquire settlement. Because they
penalize personal initiative, the settlement statutes would hardly
seem to have a place in twentieth-century America.1 0
115. Earlier hopes for the quick demise of the institution of settlement appear
to have been too sanguine. See 4 BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE i (30th ed., Davis
1869): "the Law of Settlement is daily becoming of less importance."
116. The Missouri statutes still contain provisions authorizing a county-admin-
istered program of poor relief, but the statutory provisions are quite sketchy. Mo.ANN. STAT. §§ 205.580-.760 (Vernon 1949). The settlement statute, for example,
merely defines an "inhabitant"' who is eligible for relief as a person -who bas
"resided" in the county twelve months. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.600 (Vernon 1949).For this reason, most of the problems raised in this article have not been resolved
by the Missouri statute. In practice, most general assistance is dispensed, with
state supervision, under the terms of the public assistance act, although there are
no provisions in that statute expressly defining residence for this program. Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 207.010, 208.201 (Vernon 1949). Letter from John P. Pletz, Chief,Missouri Department of Public Health and Welfare, Division of Welfare, Bureau
of Standards and Procedures, to the author, February 15, 1955.
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